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ST PETER: HISTORY AND THEOLOGY

THE English translation of Professor Cullmann's *Petrus* was published as long ago as 1953,¹ so that an attempt to assess the merits and defects of this most important work by an eminent continental Protestant scholar cannot be considered premature.

More than half the book is presented as a purely historical study of St Peter, pursued, as the author claims, by a "faithful application of strictly historical method". This is followed by two chapters on the exegesis of Matthew xvi, 17–19, and on resultant doctrinal and theological questions. The distinction between history and theology is a useful one, but it may be remarked that, since the historian's task is not merely to collect data but to interpret them, it is hardly one that can be rigorously applied. There would be reason to distrust the historical findings of a scholar who excluded *a priori* the possibility of miracles—one thinks of Loisy. And, to take an illustration which may be more relevant, the historical conclusions of a scholar who on general grounds believes that our Lord gave no permanent structural pattern to the Church are likely to be affected by such a preconception; similarly, of course, a Catholic historian is likely to bring his own preconceptions to the study of the New Testament period. It is this, in part, which explains the fact that Catholic and Protestant reconstructions of history are so often divergent, for all the honesty that is applied on both sides. It is the more striking that Professor Cullmann's findings, in the earlier part of this book, in many respects approximate to those of the best modern Catholic criticism.

These findings are summed up by the author as follows:

¹ S.C.M. Press, London, and Westminster Press, Philadelphia. The translation is by Floyd V. Filson, who used the German original. Comparison with the French version of the original (Delachaux et Niestlé, 1952) reveals some shortcomings in the English translation. I have on occasion altered the wording of the English after reference to the French version, and have indicated that this has been done by adding (F) to the quotation. It may be noted that a footnote, lacking in the English translation, mentions a Catholic work, unknown to me, that might be useful: *Die Primatworte Mt xvi. 18–19 in der altkirchlichen Exegese*, by Joseph Ludwig, 1952.

During the lifetime of Jesus (F) Peter held a pre-eminent position among the disciples; after Christ's death he presided over the Church of Jerusalem for some years; he then became the leader of the Jewish Christian mission; in this capacity, at a time which cannot be more closely determined but probably occurred at the end of his life, he came to Rome, and there, after a very short period of activity, died as a martyr under Nero.

It should be added that Professor Cullmann derives Peter's early leadership in the Church from a special commission given to him by our Lord himself. He does not hold that Peter founded the church of the city of Rome; and if this means only that there were Christians, and some ecclesiastical organization, at Rome before Peter arrived there, we need not object. It could still be held that on his eventual arrival Peter gave further form to the organization of the Roman church.

To come to closer detail, it is remarkable that Professor Cullmann accepts the view that John xxi, 15ff., purports to record a charge to Peter to "shepherd" the whole flock of Christ, not just as one apostle among others, but also as its single head. But he argues that, connected with this commission, the passage goes on to foretell the martyrdom of Peter, and that therefore the commission is limited to the period of the founding of the Church—the implication being that the office of universal shepherd committed to Peter is a transitional one, and that we must not expect that Peter will have legitimate successors in that office. This, as we shall see, is of a piece with one of the book's major contentions, namely that Catholics are quite unable to produce valid New Testament authority for their claim that the Roman primacy is a survival of the primacy of Peter. But Professor Cullmann fails to observe the inferences that may be drawn from a comparison of John xxi with John x, where our Lord compares himself with a "good shepherd". These are the only two contexts in the Fourth Gospel in which we find the simile of the shepherd and the sheep. In John x Christ himself is the good shepherd, and we are told that "the good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep". Thus, as in John xxi, the function of shepherd is closely associated with the idea of death, and it might be argued, on the basis of John x taken by itself, that this function is therefore transitory and untransmissible. But

such an argument is disproved by John xxi, where the good shepherd, before finally parting from his sheep, entrusts them to "Simon, son of John" as to a vice-shepherd ("feed *my* sheep"). Thus the moment of the removal of the shepherd is the moment for his replacement by a successor. We should therefore draw a precisely contrary inference from that proposed by Professor Cullmann: since Peter's martyrdom may be followed by the survival of the flock (note, e.g. the suggestion that the Beloved Disciple may "tarry till I come") it is to be inferred that, like his Master before him, he will be succeeded by someone who will hold the office of shepherd in his place.

There is another inference to be drawn from this comparison of John x and xxi. In the earlier chapter we are told that "there will be one flock and one shepherd". We infer that the unity of the flock is correlative to the singleness of the shepherd. Hence we may suppose that one important reason for the appointment of Simon as vice-shepherd (John xxi) was that he might both symbolize and maintain the unity of the flock—of the Church (cf. John xvii for the importance attached to this notion of unity in the Fourth Gospel). But if the authority of a vice-shepherd, and the preservation of the unity of the Church by his means, were vitally important for the first generation of the Church, when the memory of our Lord himself was still vivid, they would surely be needed no less in subsequent periods, when a vastly expanded Church, further from its inspired origins and with decreased fervour (Matthew xxiv, 12), would be subjected to greater centrifugal strains.

Of Luke xxii, 31, Professor Cullmann says that it "should be cited in this debate much oftener than it is", and that it clearly gives to Peter for the future a unique function amongst his brethren. But here again he sees no grounds for supposing that Peter was to have anyone to succeed him in this function. This text, the one from John xxi which we have already examined, and Matthew xvi, 17–19, are the three favourite Catholic texts in support of the Roman primacy. It is significant that Professor Cullmann finds evidence in each of them for a Petrine primacy, but in each case denies the existence of a valid link between Peter and the Popes. Such are the conditions of the debate between him and us. As we shall see, it is at least

as much a difference on the theological level as on that of exegesis.

Meanwhile, he is prepared to grant us one more point: the presence of Peter at Rome and his martyrdom there; though it is perhaps not certain that this is vital to our case. As evidence for Peter's having been at Rome he thinks it quite probable, but not certain, that by "Babylon" in I Peter v, 13, is meant Rome. If so, this is strong evidence for Peter having been there, even if it is held that I Peter was not written by Peter himself (a pseudonymous document, written, as I Peter probably was, in the first century, would hardly represent Peter as writing from Rome if it was not known that he had been there). I think the case might be made stronger by appeal to the fact that the same verse carries a greeting from Mark. Dr Vincent Taylor (*The Gospel according to St Mark*, 1952) says that there can be no doubt that the author of Mark was "Mark, the attendant of Peter", and that the tradition that Mark was written for the use of the church in Rome is probably correct, supported as it is by "the relative frequency of Latinized words and forms of speech" in the Gospel. If, then, it is already probable that "Babylon" means Rome, it becomes more so when we find that Mark is represented as being at "Babylon" with Peter.

Stronger, however, in Professor Cullmann's opinion, than the evidence of I Peter for Peter's presence at Rome is that of I Clement. His lengthy study of this piece of evidence seems to me to be masterly; incidentally, it provides a powerful argument for thinking that internal Christian dissension had something to do with Peter's falling into the government's hands. "From the investigation of I Clement we conclude, not with absolute certainty but yet with the highest probability, that Peter suffered martyrdom at Rome about the time of the Neronian persecution."

There is other possible literary evidence, as Professor Cullmann agrees: Ignatius,¹ perhaps the *Ascension of Isaiah*, pos-

¹ I disagree with Professor Cullmann on one point in connexion with Ignatius. He suggests that Ignatius's words: 'I do not command you like Peter and Paul' might mean 'I do not give you commands as if I were Peter or Paul'. It is obvious that, if this had been Ignatius's meaning, he would have written not "Peter and Paul" but "Peter or Paul". Professor Cullmann mentions in a footnote O. Perler's "Ignatius von Antiochien und die römische Christengemeinde" (*Diuus Thomas*, 1944); I think he might have given more consideration to Perler's argument that Ignatius recognizes the primacy of Rome.

sibly even Apocalypse xi, 5 ff. (on which cf. Cullmann, pp. 88 ff., but also A. Feuillet, *New Testament Studies*, April, 1958, who rejects a primary reference to Peter and Paul, but thinks that they *may* be alluded to).

The literary argument for Peter having been at Rome can, I think, be pushed a little further. John xxi points to Peter's martyrdom, and specifically to his martyrdom by crucifixion. I Peter is probable evidence for his having been at Rome. I Clement is very probable evidence for his martyrdom at Rome.

It is unlikely that any of these bits of evidence is simply dependent on any other of them. Dr Selwyn (*The First Epistle of St Peter*, 1949) thinks that I Clement quotes from, or echoes the language of, I Peter; in which case I Peter cannot depend on I Clement—and of course, if I Clement implies Peter's death at Rome, it implies it as something publicly known to the Roman Christians. If, however, of three independent pieces of evidence, each is supported by at least one of the others, their combined force would appear to be more than three times the force of each. And it may be remarked that E. L. Allen (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1954) suggests that an interest (in some Christian circle or other) in the transmission of Peter's primacy may underlie the addition of John xxi to a Gospel which appeared to be complete without it. It is hardly likely that such transmission was envisaged in reference to any other see than Rome, and hardly likely that it would have been envisaged for Rome unless it was presupposed that Peter had been in Rome. Professor Cullmann's observation (p. 114) seems justified: "Were we to impose on all the facts of ancient history too strict criteria of probability, we should have to strike out of our history books a large part of their contents" (F).

From the literary evidence Professor Cullmann turns to that of liturgy and archaeology. On the subject of the Vatican excavations I think his findings may be unduly minimizing. For instance, he seems reluctant to carry the evidence of the *aedicula* or shrine, round which Constantine built the first St Peter's, further back than the "last years of the second century". English readers might do well to re-examine *The Shrine of St Peter and the Vatican Excavations*, Toynbee and Perkins

(1956), which is more recent than Professor Cullmann's book.¹

There is one point in Professor Cullmann's historical reconstruction from which I should wish to dissent with some vigour. He holds that Peter, after governing the Church from Jerusalem for quite a short time, gave up Church administration for missionary work in the Jewish Christian mission, and thus became dependent on Jerusalem and on James, who was henceforth the ruler of the whole body of the faithful except those who came under the Gentile mission, who were not only independent of Jerusalem, but *a fortiori* of Peter. He notes that already in Galatians ii, 9, James is mentioned before Cephas; that in Galatians ii, 12, we learn that Peter "feared" the circumcision party; that in the Council at Jerusalem James (so Cullmann holds) presided, drew the conclusion, and formulated the decree, while Peter may be held to speak simply as the representative of the Jewish Christian mission; that according to the Pseudo-Clementine literature no teacher was authorized without warrant from James, and in particular Peter was sent to Caesarea at James's command; that this literature (also Chrysostom and Epiphanius) says that James was installed by the Lord; and that Hegesippus (Eusebius, H.E. II 23, 4) stated that James "took over the church along with the apostles"—but this brief fragment does not allow us to determine whether "the church" here means the universal Church or only the local Jerusalem or Palestinian church. It is of course a fact that after Acts xii, 17 ("he departed to another place"), Peter is never again mentioned in Acts except on the occasion of the Council at Jerusalem. Professor Cullmann apparently sees references to Peter's Jewish Christian mission in Galatians ii, 7, 9 ("seeing that I have been entrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision just as Peter has

¹ Dr John Lowe, Dean of Christ Church, in his *Saint Peter* (1956), follows Cullmann closely both in his historical findings and in his theological denials. He writes: "A combination of the literary and the archaeological evidence, and mainly the former, makes it appear highly probable (I would almost say 'morally sure') that Peter did come to Rome, suffered there as a martyr, and most likely in the Vatican district. There he was commemorated at least as early as the second half of the second century, and there, or thereabouts, his bones may rest" (p. 45). Elsewhere Dr Lowe remarks that Ignatius knew I Clement "and so cannot be considered as offering certainly independent confirmation" of Peter's having been at Rome. It is perhaps, however, unlikely that Ignatius, if he wrote about A.D. 112, would have had no knowledge of Peter other than what is accessible to us today.

with that of the circumcision . . . that we should go to the Gentiles, but they to the circumcision").

It may be replied that, if James is mentioned before Cephas in Galatians ii, 9, this may well be because James's agreement with Paul was specially important, since James was the leader specially regarded by the Judaizing party; that James's adhesion to the decision of the Council at Jerusalem is highlighted by Acts for the same reason; and that Peter's "fears" require no further explanation than the fact that, if the Judaizing party were provoked beyond measure, the head of the Church might find himself faced with a disastrous schism. We must not forget that the first Christians were actual human beings; nor that Peter (whose probable sympathy with Paul's universalism is admitted by Professor Cullmann) was between the "devil" of a genius of the first order who wished to push things to their logical conclusions and the "deep sea" of a numerically powerful Palestinian Jewish church with its roots deep in the pre-Christian past. Think of a Newman, trying to hold together a movement containing a W. G. Ward on the one hand, and a high-and-dry conservative wing under a Pusey on the other; Newman might well have "feared" the High Church section without admitting his own subordination to Pusey! Was it not the task of Peter, the "one shepherd", to preserve the unity of the "one flock"? Was not eating with the Gentiles a rather petty practical detail—like wearing a white linen chasuble instead of a surplice—even if Paul thought otherwise?

It may be thought surprising that Professor Cullmann places such reliance on the evidence of the Pseudo-Clementine literature, on which, by the way, he is an authority. The Anglican historian B. J. Kidd (I, p. 138) wrote that the Clementine *Recognitions* and *Homilies* are in substance probably of the second or early third centuries, and that their purpose is "the inculcation of the author's Judaizing opinions which is his real concern in writing". That such a source should seek to subordinate Peter to James is what might have been expected; it is clearer evidence of Peter's Pauline sympathies than of his real subjection to James. Professor Cullmann (cf. his *Le Problème du Pseudo-Clementin*, pp. 92-8) finds incorporated in this literature a source which goes back to the beginning of the second century;

but, as he points out, this source was strongly anti-Pauline. More recently (*Revue Biblique*, October 1957) A. Salles has sought to extract from this literature a source which would be little later in date than the Epistle to the Galatians—an anti-Pauline diatribe he calls this supposed source.

As regards Galatians ii, 7–9, H. J. Chapman's study of this passage in *Revue Bénédictine*, 1912, is, in my opinion, still worth study. It would seem that so far from this passage showing that Peter held a commission from James, his commission comes—like Paul's to the Gentiles—direct from God, and that Paul here shows his knowledge of the saying of our Lord recorded for us in Matthew xvi, 17 f.¹ It may be added that, since it is not sug-

¹ For a recent study of Galatians i and ii in relation to Matthew cf. A.-M. Denis, *Revue Biblique*, October 1957, where it is argued that while Galatians shows the influence not indeed of Matthew xi, 25–7, but rather of ideas which find their place there, Matthew xvi, 17–18a, on the other hand, shows the influence of Galatians. The author remarks that the metaphor of building is common in Paul, unique here in the Synoptic Gospels and that here alone (apart from Matthew xviii) in the Synoptics we have the term "church" (so common in Paul), and here in a stage of evolution of the idea which is only reached by Paul in Ephesians. Further, the idea of revelation (*apokaluptein*) is Pauline (though it is also found in Matthew xi, 25–7), and "flesh and blood" is used uniquely here in the Synoptic Gospels, whereas in Paul it occurs both in Galatians i, 16, and in I Corinthians xv, 50. It would be impertinent to pretend to dispose of Père Denis's exciting hypothesis in a footnote. But as the dominical origin of the Matthaeian saying in its present form is in question, it may be permissible to make a few observations. It seems to me that, if the idea of "church" in Matthew corresponds to the full Pauline evolution of the term as we find it in Ephesians, its use with this full meaning is hardly adequately explained by reference to Galatians. As regards the metaphor of building, certainly the word-play ("Peter and upon this Rock") is not derived from Paul (Paul's use of "Peter" in Galatians ii instead of his usual "Cephas" may be derived from the word-play; the reverse is impossible); and if Matthew did not simply invent the whole of xvi, 18, we are entitled to ask what was the framework in which the word-play occurred in the tradition utilized by Matthew. "Thou art Rock and upon this rock . . ." seems to require the verb "to build", so that the metaphor of building would have come to Matthew not from Paul but from an independent tradition. It is extraordinary that Père Denis seems to have joined the conspiracy to overlook Matthew vii, 24–7 (cf. Luke vi, 47–9), when discussing xvi, 18; "building", in vii, 24, 26, is, it is true, not grammatically a metaphor; but in sense it is. It may also be noted that the alleged saying about "raising" the temple in three days may be supposed to have been a virtual use of the metaphor of building. But if we must suppose that Matthew (unless he invented the whole saying) found "Thou art Rock and upon this rock I will build . . ." in a non-Pauline tradition, we have next to ask: what was the object of the verb "build"? It seems to me that the presumption is that it was originally an Aramaic word of which "church" (*ecclesia*) is Matthew's (or the tradition's) translation. It is conceivable that it was "my house" or even "my temple" (supposing that the metaphor of rock looks to the rock on which the Jerusalem temple was built); but in either case, we should only have to deal with a metaphorical description of the Messianic community, and the title "church" for this community was in use in primitive Christianity before and independently of Paul.

gested that James went out on a Jewish-Christian mission, Galatians ii, 9, is no proof that Peter did so.¹

The fact is that we do not know what Peter did or where he went after Acts xii, 17; apart from his appearance at the Council

(I need hardly add that the occurrence of "flesh and blood" twice in Paul but only once in Matthew is not enough to prove dependence either way.) From all this it follows that Père Denis's suggestion really means that the whole saying "Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my Church" is a Matthaean invention. But he does not doubt that our Lord conferred a real primacy on Peter. Was it then with no regard for this primacy that Jesus gave Simon the son of Jonas the title Rock? And if it was not given with regard to the primacy, what was the purpose of this title? It is, as Cullmann argues, a title, not a proper name, and the giving of it "corresponds to Jewish custom to choose as titles words which somehow express a promise and impose an obligation on those who are to bear them" (F.). The fact that it was early translated from its Aramaic form Kepha (frequent in the epistles of Paul) to the Greek form Petros probably indicates that it was recognized by the Church to be more than a "nick-name"—to be pregnant with meaning for the faithful. Was it just "lucky" for Matthew that the title—whatever its primitive significance—could form the basis of a word-play which would give a new and unsuspected emphasis to the Petrine primacy? If the name had from the first a reference to the primacy, it was surely, already from the first, pregnant with the notion of the Rock on which Christ would build his Messianic community. It is probable that this meaning was explained by our Lord himself at some time before his Ascension, and it is therefore, I suggest, improbable that Matthew invented the "saying" which in fact explains this meaning. Cf. also what is said below on the literary analysis of the section of Matthew in which the saying is embedded. So much for details. Looking at things more broadly, it remains that, if the saying in Matthew xvi, 17 f., is not dependent on Galatians, then the reverse must be true. Now it is obvious that Paul must have been familiar with the general primitive tradition that lies behind our Synoptic Gospels. But what impresses me is the fact that he appears to be familiar with that tradition (if we take the evidence of his epistles as a whole) in its specifically Matthaean form. I may perhaps refer to my article, "St Paul's Knowledge and Use of St Matthew" (*Downsider Review*, 1948), where I draw attention to articles by C. H. Dodd (*Expository Times*, 1947) and J. B. Orchard (*Biblica*, 1938) as well as to J. H. Chapman's article referred to above, and add some additional points. In particular, I do not know of any refutation of Dom Orchard's thesis that the epistles to the Thessalonians presuppose the eschatological teaching of our Lord in the form which it has assumed in Matthew as contrasted with the Marcan and Lucan forms. Without being so provocative as to infer that Matthew, as we know it, is anterior to the whole Pauline corpus, I will simply say that these considerations seem to me to place the *onus probandi* firmly on Père Denis's shoulders, and that I do not think his case is strong enough to sustain that burden. Pauline influence in the New Testament is probably widespread. It can be suspected in Mark and John as well as in Luke-Acts and I Peter. When we come to Matthew, traces of such influence are, in C. H. Dodd's words, "indeed difficult to find", and the traces of Matthaean or proto-Matthaeanic influence on Paul are manifold. (Incidentally, the idea of a stabilizing rock may lurk behind Luke's "confirm thy brethren".)

¹ But why is Peter's function described by Paul as an "apostolate to the circumcision"? Lagrange (ad loc.) writes: "When he was writing to the Galatians, Paul knew by experience that the distinction (sc. of areas of apostleship) was by no means absolute. If he expresses himself so clearly, and this three times over, the reason is that this was how things had actually been arranged at Jerusalem, taking the past as type and measure of the future, but without claiming to fetter apostolic liberty and the grace of God."

at Jerusalem (and the visit to Antioch, which is not easy to date) he passes out of certain history till his arrival at Rome. But there is every *a priori* reason to suppose that, if our Lord had personally put him in charge of the Church and, in the same context, spoke of his martyrdom, Peter would not surrender his primacy till death took it from him.¹

But if the Pseudo-Clementine literature cannot prove this rather bizarre contention (or "difficult hypothesis", to borrow Père Denis's phrase) of Professor Cullmann, it may yet serve to remind us of one of the gravest dangers through which the Church ever had to pass. From the standpoint of a theologian, Christianity is not related to pre-Christian Judaism as early Protestantism was (on a Catholic interpretation of the facts) to the Catholic Church. It was not a revolution from, but an evolutionary transformation of, Judaism. Its basis, already in the teaching of our Lord himself, was a personal adhesion to Jesus as to "him that was to come". It was no longer enough to be of the biological progeny of Abraham, no longer enough to be circumcized or to obey the Law. To "believe the gospel" was to "follow Jesus". The consequences of this appear alike in the choice and commissioning of the Twelve and of Peter and in the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple; the Church, the true and believing Israel, was to be released from the bonds of locality and of the Jewish hierarchy. The focal point of the Church as an institution was to be not a place—neither Jerusalem nor Rome—but an office held by a vice-shepherd of Christ's flock.

However, the apostolic body, despite the movement's primitive links with Galilee, established itself at Jerusalem in the earliest days after the Ascension. In the nature of the case the earliest recruits were in overwhelming majority Palestinian Jews, and Acts vi, 7, even affirms that "a great multitude of (Jewish)

¹ Dr Lowe does not agree with Cullmann on this alleged subjection of Peter to James: "It seems to me anachronistic to suppose that there was an official transfer of authority. It was just natural that, as most of the Twelve were dispersed, some of them perhaps dead, and Peter away a great deal of the time, James with the prestige of his kinship to the Lord and his undoubted piety and gifts should come to the fore. Also it sounds to me much too modern to suggest that Peter elected to renounce administration and go to the mission field. We will persist in reading back the highly organized administrative system of a later day into a period when there is no evidence of its existence" (pp. 18 f.).

priests began to give ear to the faith"—they were probably not instructed very carefully before being received into the Church! For some time at least it was taken for granted that the faithful would continue to worship in the Jewish Temple; and we are told that Paul himself regularly sought out the Jewish synagogues.

Though not theologically a schism, the primitive Church was, as a phenomenal actuality, very like one. And is there not almost a law that schisms, their first enthusiasm for protest past, tend to revert towards some part of the "orthodoxy" from which they had revolted? "Faith," wrote Fr Leslie Walker (*The Problem of Reunion*, 1920), ". . . among Protestants is less anti-Catholic than it was. The repudiation of Catholic doctrine is no longer the fundamental article of their faith. Instead of asserting what they disbelieve, they are content now to assert what all of us believe in common. The Protestant element in Protestantism is disappearing, and with it the term Protestant itself."

The same tendency seems to have operated in Palestinian Christianity. It was the other side of a failure to persevere at the exacting level of the new insights offered by our Lord himself. Men found it difficult to shake themselves free from the prestige of the Temple and the Law, of traditional ceremonial and custom, and of the racial principle; and the teaching of Jesus did not seem to answer all questions with the decisiveness of Paul's logic. Was not Jesus himself the "son of David"? It is a fascinating conjecture that Joseph had been the actual "claimant" to the Davidic throne; that this is why Matthew gives the genealogy of Joseph, not of Mary, and why Joseph was so perplexed by Mary's pregnancy: was it, or was it not, the divine will that this child, who was not Joseph's son, should by Mary's marriage to Joseph become the legal heir to the "pretendentship"?¹ And was not James, the Lord's kinsman, perhaps the next in the "succession"? And "we know from Hegesippus that after James's

¹ P. X. Léon-Dufour, in *L'Annonce à Joseph* (*Mélanges Bibliques rédigés en l'Honneur de André Robert*, Paris n.d.), suggests that Matthew i, 18–25, presupposes the virginal conception of Jesus, but is so written as to lead up to the legal paternity of Joseph. The question is: how can a child, even though the son of a virgin, inherit the throne of David? And the answer: it was not a man, not even a son of David, who introduced the Messiah into the Davidic line; it was God himself (by the angel's message: Fear not, Joseph thou son of David, etc.). P. Léon-Dufour does not suggest, I think, that Joseph was the son of David, i.e. the legitimist claimant to the throne; but such a hypothesis would explain why his immediate collaterals had to fear Imperial suspicions in the reign of Domitian.

death there were at the head of the Jewish Christian church other kinsmen of the Lord: Symeon, the son of Clopas; then under Domitian two grandsons of Judas, brethren of the Lord and heads of the church, were cited before the Emperor because of their Davidic origin; and according to Julius Africanus the kinsfolk of the Lord were preoccupied with the establishment of their genealogy" (Cullmann, *Le Problème du Pseudo-Clémentin*, p. 251). We see the Judaizers through the hostile eyes of Paul, and Paul was undoubtedly right in the theory behind his intransigence; but it is possible to sympathize with the defeated party.

The victory of this re-Judaizing tendency was prevented, in the Church as a whole, by several factors. The spread of the new faith among Gentiles, and especially Paul's missionary triumphs, gave a counterpoise to the Palestinian bias. By itself this might only have led to schism among the Christians, but, as Professor Cullmann and Dr Lowe agree, Peter was probably in sympathy with the Gentile Christian cause, and at the critical moment it may have been Peter who secured James's support for the forward movement. The Jewish revolt and the events of A.D. 70 were a shattering blow to the Judaizing wing so far as it remained within the Church. Soon afterwards Rome, already bathed in the blood of many martyrs, among them both the apostle of the Gentiles and the vice-shepherd of the flock, had sufficiently recovered from the Neronian persecution to be able to enter into the position to which it had once seemed that Jerusalem might aspire. We must not forget the paradox of this development: Rome had had no sacred associations for the believer; on the contrary it was the centre of the persecuting world-power, already designated as "Babylon" if I Peter was written in the early sixties. On the other hand, the church at Rome was already numerous, and had probably made converts among persons of great eminence in Roman society (see Lightfoot's study of I Clement). And Rome, or some official or officials within the Roman Christian community, must have seemed to be the only discoverable heir of whatever powers Peter had been in a position to transmit.

What, then, actually happened when Peter left Jerusalem to go to "another place" (Acts xii, 17)? Nothing more or less, I suggest, than what the text states. Peter went away, and may

never again have resumed habitual residence at Jerusalem; but he went away without renouncing whatever powers of leadership he had received from the lips of our Lord. Where did he intend to go? We do not know. He might have thought of Mesopotamia, of Antioch, or of Alexandria. But in fact he ended up, many years later, at Rome. If he turned his eyes westwards rather than to the East or South, it may be that he feared that the onward march of the Gentile mission, especially as conducted by Paul, must lead to schism if his own influence was absent. It does not seem to me impossible that Rome was his ultimate objective all along. He had grown up to think of Jerusalem as the centre of the world, and at that centre he and his colleagues had established the centre of the Church before these new problems arose. But he knew, from our Lord's prediction, that Jerusalem was doomed. He may have had the strategic insight to recognize that, if only the official centre of the Church could be located at Rome (audacious though the idea must seem), the prospects of her universal mission would be immensely enhanced.

But although, on this view, Peter handed over none of his special authority to James, his departure left James's position at the head of the Jerusalem church unrivalled. And for years Jerusalem had been the *de facto* centre of the Christian movement, the centre whence supreme authority had been exercised by the Twelve and their leader. Indeed, at the beginning, the Jerusalem church must have thought of itself as *the* Church, with some outlying dependencies in Galilee and elsewhere in Palestine. Henceforth Peter could rely only on his personal prestige, which was doubtless great, and on the commission he had received from our Lord. We remember his "dissimulation" at Antioch, and the agonized anxiety of Paul still throbs in the pages of the Epistle to the Galatians. The short-term result of his departure from Jerusalem was to strengthen enormously the hands of the Judaizers. On the other hand, had he remained there is it not humanly speaking likely that he would have become the prisoner of the Judaizing wing of the Church and of its outlook? Herod the persecutor may have served the future of the Church better than any could understand at the time.

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(*To be concluded*)

THE SYNTAX OF CHRISTIAN LATIN

THE early Christians, although not of the world, continued to live in it. They came of the same stock and environment as their pagan neighbours. Their language was the same and, if they wished to escape detection as Christians, had to remain the same. The Latin of the first centuries of our era changed rapidly in the direction of the modern Romance languages; the speech of the Christian minority inevitably and imperceptibly underwent the same changes. But the works of the great Classical authors had been written once and for all, to serve as a literary model for the Western world, even to the present day. When Christianity came into its own and the Fathers produced their Latin works, they did not follow this model too closely but made use of a language and style which were closer to popular usage. Our Latin grammars and manuals of prose composition are, on the contrary, based on this Classical model, with the result that the Fathers use forms and constructions that are not found, or are even expressly condemned, in the books we use at school.

When Latin was a spoken, living language it was, like all living organisms, constantly changing.¹ Cicero, the supreme classical model of Latin prose, died in 43 B.C.; St Jerome gave his Vulgate to the world about A.D. 400; the earliest extant document in a Romance language, into which Latin developed, belongs to A.D. 842. On a mathematical basis, we should expect the Vulgate to resemble the last as much as it resembles the first. The Vulgate is, of course, far more like Ciceronian Latin than like Romance, but Romance can throw considerable light on the Vulgate, which lies on the road leading to Romance.

There is, linguistically speaking, at once a particular advantage and a particular danger in taking the Vulgate as representing Christian Latin. It is, of course, the work best known to those who say Mass and Breviary every day, and it had a great influence on the writings of the Fathers, just as the vernacular Bible has a great influence on the language of our sermons. It

¹ This theme was developed in THE CLERGY REVIEW, April 1954, pp. 213 ff., and therefore mere reference is made to it here.

has also the linguistic advantage of containing more colloquialisms and Romance idioms than other works by reputable Christian authors. The danger is that it is a literal translation from Greek and Hebrew, and thus many of its linguistic points of interest are not examples of Late Latin but of foreign idiom.

The most important reason for this is the influence of the Old Latin (i.e. pre-Jerome) version. St Jerome's Latin Bible is not a uniform production. Its history is extremely complicated, therefore only a few salient facts are given here. St Jerome himself makes a most important distinction between what he merely corrected and what he translated afresh: "*Novum Testamentum Graecae fidei reddidi, Vetus juxta Hebraicam transtuli.*"¹ This correction of the New Testament may not have extended beyond the Gospels; nor does the translation of the Old Testament extend to the deutero-canonical books.

Our Latin New Testament, therefore, is merely a revision, in whole or in part, of the Old Latin version, which had been in existence for some time. The latter was barbarous in places: it occasionally used the language of the streets and it was a slavish translation from the Greek. The first feature makes it valuable as a source-book for the student of Romance, the second makes it a trap for the unwary. The Old Latin version and St Jerome's new one existed side by side, with the result that each affected the other. Therefore, not even St Jerome's direct translation from the Hebrew is, as we have it today, free from the influence of the Old Latin.

It must be realized that the lingua franca of the Mediterranean was not Latin but Greek. Greek was the language of the first Christian writers, the language of Christians in Rome itself. St Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans in Greek and St Mark wrote his gospel at Rome in Greek. The catacombs in Rome abound in Greek inscriptions. In the first two centuries only three popes have Latin names; and one of these, St Clement, wrote his Epistle in Greek. It was not until the third century that Latin regained supremacy in Rome. Indeed, it is true to say that Greek was the language of early Christianity, just as it was the language of the New Testament. Latin was much indebted to Greek for vocabulary and mode of thought; Christian

¹ *De Viris Illustribus*. Migne, P.L., xxiii, 758.

Latin was still further indebted, since its Scriptures and its specifically Christian concepts came to it through the medium of Greek. When a Latin version of the New Testament came into being, it was a crude and imperfect Latinization of the Greek original.

An example in the Latin New Testament of slavish following of the Greek is the use of the genitive of comparison. Latin, of course, used the ablative, but in John xiv, 12, we find: *Majora horum faciet*—greater than these shall he do. And again: *Ampliorem honorem habet domus qui fabricavit illam* (Heb. iii, 3); this is untranslatable until it is realized that *domus* is genitive and means “than the house”. This is merely one example of Greek syntax chosen out of many.

Interpretation of Biblical language is an immense field of work. To mention but one aspect, the style and thought of most of the Old Testament is not Latin, nor even European, but Oriental, and therefore Oriental phraseology has found its way into every European language which has ever been the vehicle of Christian thought. The influence on the Latin Scriptures of the languages from which it was translated will not, however, be dealt with here. Attention will be drawn only to those linguistic features of the Vulgate which exemplify a later idiom than that of Cicero and his followers, and even here closer study may show that some of the examples chosen can be explained by the fact of their being translations from another language. But we are, of course, concerned with any foreign idioms which influenced later Latin. Such features in Christian texts cannot be ascribed to over-literal translation when the language has adopted them for its own.

The chief difference between Classical and Church Latin is intangible, the result of the difference in purpose of the writers. One can only say that the Fathers felt that rhetoric and artifice did not accord with the explaining of divine mysteries to the people of God. This had the effect of making them use a simpler and more direct style, much closer to the everyday speech of the ordinary citizen. One does not find long and elaborate sentences, with many subordinate clauses, but simpler sentences with a liberal use of the common *et*.

The syntax, too, is a good deal looser. It is common to find, particularly in Scripture, both a strict Classical construction and a more popular one used side by side. This is a recurrent phenomenon in the history of literature, to be encountered whenever writers break away from a strict grammatical tradition in order to follow the spoken language more closely. It is a feature of present-day English and French. A well-known example in the latter language is the variety of tenses used instead of the grammatically correct imperfect subjunctive. As for English, it may happen that in some future age scholars will weigh our somewhat colloquial twentieth-century prose in the balance with Dr Johnson and find us wanting.

It must not be assumed, therefore, when attention is drawn to a non-Classical construction, that the Classical construction is not also found. Ciceronian Latin had failed to extend its influence over the spoken language in any great or lasting way, but it cannot be discounted as an important factor in the formation of written Christian Latin. It is with the written language that we are concerned here; the spoken language can only be arrived at by indirect methods and the occasional remarks of grammarians. The Fathers, being educated men, had learned grammar and rhetoric at school and had been trained to write their native tongue in accordance with the traditional rules. Their situation when preaching or writing was not essentially different from that of a present-day priest who knows his grammar but is not prepared to sacrifice intelligibility to it. Such a one imitates St Augustine who said: "*Melius est reprehendant nos grammatici, quam non intelligent populi.*" He will endeavour to be correct without being stilted, to be homely without being undignified. It would not be surprising to find in such a sermon observance of strict grammatical rules side by side with commonly condoned infringements of them.

It is to be understood, then, that what follows is merely a selection of usages in written Christian Latin which depart from the rules of Ciceronian Latin. It is not even asserted that the usage described is more commonly met with than observance of the rule. In the majority of cases, however, we do know that the departures from the rules were permanent features of

the spoken language which were to prevail and survive in the Romance languages.

As examples of looser syntax can be instanced the use of an ablative absolute when the participle describes the subject or object: *Ascendente eo in naviculam, secuti sunt eum discipuli* (Matt. viii, 23), or the use of the present participle for action not strictly contemporaneous: *Discipuli ejus relinquentes eum, omnes fugerunt* (Mark xiv, 50). Our books of Latin prose composition see fit to warn expressly against these two constructions, because English does precisely the same. It is this sort of syntax which makes Church Latin easier for us than Classical Latin.

In the sentence *Omnis populus simul properaverunt* (Eccl., i, 19) a plural verb follows a singular collective noun, as in colloquial English.¹ Such a construction is based on sense rather than on grammar, and is a sign of popular usage gaining ground at the expense of traditional grammar. A similar *constructio ad sensum* is *multitudo militiae caelstis, laudantium Deum* (Luke ii, 13), in which a plural adjective qualifies a singular noun. In Matt. xxvi, 18, Christ tells His disciples to say to the householder: *Aपud te facio Pascha*. The present is obviously being used as a future, just as we ourselves use it (e.g. I am going tomorrow).

A number of niceties are neglected. The present subjunctive, as well as the Classical perfect, is used for negative commands: *De ligno autem scientiae boni et mali ne comedas* (Gen. ii, 17). Similarly the ordinary *non* is used as well as the special *ne*: *Non mireris quia dixi tibi* (John iii, 7). The negative of *ut* is expressed by *ut non* in clauses other than those of result, to which it is confined by the grammars: *Nolite judicare, ut non judicemini*—so that you may not be judged, i.e. purpose. Questions are asked without any introductory particle: *Credis hoc?* (John xi, 26.) Only intonation could have informed a hearer that this was a question, as is the case very often in modern Italian, where word order is still fairly fluid.

These examples have some bearing on the formation of Romance and are therefore not isolated phenomena. They offer no difficulty to the translator, rather the contrary, unless

¹ Modern English makes use of this to convey shades of meaning. Thus there is a slight difference in meaning between "The village is producing a play" and "The village are producing a play". It is not merely the expression, as Miss Mitford would have it, of a U or non-U attitude to the villagers.

it should happen that the existence of Classical and non-Classical constructions side by side puzzles him. He might think that *eum* and *eo*, in the ablative absolute quoted, refer to different persons; or that *ut non*, cited above, signifies a clause of consequence. Once it is realized that the constructions are really alternatives, one being literary and the other colloquial, any difficulty vanishes.

Passages in *Oratio Obliqua*, or Indirect Speech, very common in Classical authors, are not usually met with in Church Latin. The changes necessary to turn a speech into *Oratio Obliqua* are complicated, so this contributes not a little to making Church Latin easier. Only one construction used in *Oratio Obliqua* is common, the use of Accusative + Infinitive to render a noun clause after verbs of saying and such like; and even this loses ground steadily to a colloquial construction. The type *Sciebant ipsum esse Christum* (Luke iv, 41) gives way to the type *Scimus quia verax es* (Matt. xxii, 16).

A cursory knowledge of the modern Romance languages is enough to convince one of the importance of the conjunction *que* or *che* in their mechanism. As is the case with the English conjunction *that*, it is the standard way of introducing noun clauses, and various other types of clause as well. The purist, therefore, should not be scandalized by such sentences as: *Ego dico tibi quia tu es Petrus* (Matt. xvi, 18); *Vidit Deus quod esset bonum* (Gen. i, 12); *Scimus quoniam translati sumus de morte ad vitam* (I John iii, 14). They produced the Romance idiom with *que*, *che* and are thus of the greatest importance. The origin of the construction is not clear. It may have been a vernacular idiom, or possibly an extension of the explanatory clause in which a noun clause is in apposition: *Hoc scio, quod scribit nulla puella tibi*—I know this, that no girl writes to you (Martial, Epigrams xi, 64). It became more and more common among later writers, and particularly so in the Bible.

The reason for this seems to be the importance in the Greek Bible of *ὅτι*, which corresponds to *quod* in some of its uses. The Latin translators, wishing to follow the Greek as closely as possible, made great use of the colloquial construction. They went further: *ὅτι* meant “because”, so they translated it by *quia*

and *quoniam*, as well as by *quod*. In Greek the verb after *ὅτι* is in the indicative and in the same tense as direct speech would use. In the Vulgate these noun clauses were put into subjunctive or indicative indifferently, while the tense may be that of either Greek or Latin usage. Thus we have sentences like: *Nesciebat quia verum est quod fiebat per angelum* (Acts xii, 9). And, as if this were not enough, they even translate literally the Greek idiom of using *ὅτι* to introduce the actual words spoken: *Si quis dixerit quoniam diligo Deum* (I John iv, 20). Inverted commas would suffice in English: If anyone should say, "I love God." The Vulgate often punctuates as if the conjunction were part of the speech: *Et iterum negavit cum juramento: Quia non novi hominem* (Matt. xxvi, 72). Using *quod* or *quia* to introduce noun clauses was good post-Classical Latin, but the examples just cited are barbarous and foreign.

It is extremely interesting to consider the strange fact that Greek, through Christian Latin as an intermediary, should influence the formation of the modern Romance languages. It would seem that colloquial Latin and Greek had already developed the same idiom, the introduction of noun clauses by *quod* and *ὅτι* respectively; *ὅτι* meant "because" as well as "that", therefore in the Vulgate *quia* was used with the meaning "that" and became the word used by modern French and its sisters to introduce most of their clauses. It could, with reason, be objected that *quod* and *quia* both mean "because" in Latin; this could explain the extension to *quia*, so why bring in Greek? The fact remains, however, that this use of *quia* is first and chiefly met with in the Vulgate, which translated clauses with *ὅτι* so literally. The inference is that it was adopted by Christians through the influence of their Scriptures and that, as the Roman Empire became Christian, it was Christian Latin which developed into Romance.¹

Again there is no difficulty for the English-speaking translator, who is accustomed to the same usage in his native tongue. There are, however, two possible pitfalls. He might think that *quod*, etc., always mean "because", and translate as a causal

¹ An interesting case of confusion between *quod* and *quia* is found in the 7th lesson for the Nativity of St John the Baptist: *Sed tempus siletur infantiae, eo quia infantiae impedimenta nescivit.* (St Ambrose, Comm. in Luc., Lib. 2, n. 30.) After *eo*, of course, one ought to find relative *quod*, not causal *quod* or *quia*.

clause.¹ Or he might be puzzled by the existence of the two constructions and think that the Accusative + Infinitive has a different significance from the clause with *quod*. Again the difficulty vanishes when it is realized that they are alternative constructions.

The infinitive is much used in Latin. The Accusative + Infinitive mentioned above is very frequent; so is the infinitive after verbs like *possum*, *volo*, *jubeo*, and so too is its use as a noun, as in *Laborare est orare*. Another construction very much used is *ut* + Subjunctive. It is used for clauses of purpose and result, after verbs of asking, fearing and so on, and it shares with the infinitive in being the stock construction when a verb or clause is the subject or object or completion of the main verb.

The usage as regards these two constructions is by no means as rigid as the textbooks would have us suppose. In fact, we must distinguish between Classical Latin as it really was and Classical Latin as schoolboys are taught it; in other words, between the Classical Latin which we read and the Classical Latin which we are taught to write. The former was to a certain extent artificial and to a considerable extent divorced from the contemporary spoken language, but it became in the hands of verbal artists the vehicle of some of the greatest literature of all time. It was their native language and therefore not a dead and rigid thing; even when confined by the rules which they made for themselves, it was plastic enough to admit of a variety of constructions. On the other hand, the Classical Latin which schoolboys are taught is one of the results of the Classical revival of the Renaissance which are still with us. Its aim is to make the pupil write Latin prose as Cicero did; therefore he must use the forms and constructions which Cicero used. But, whereas Cicero could and did on occasion use another form or construction, the pupil must not. Being taught like this is valuable as a mental discipline and as an initiation into the Greco-Roman civilization to which the Western world owes so much. but it is not really the study of language. Least of all does it

¹ This has possibly happened in the usual rendering of Matt. xvi, 7, 8: *Dicentes: Quia panes non accepimus. Sciens autem Jesus dixit: Quid cogitatis . . . quia panes non habetis?*

furnish the equipment for criticizing Latin authors from a linguistic point of view.

The textbooks say that, of the two common verbs meaning "to command", *jubeo* must be followed by the Infinitive and *impero* by *ut* + Subjunctive. Undoubtedly this is the more frequent usage, but Classical authors (Cicero included) use an infinitive after *impero* and *ut* + Subjunctive after *jubeo*. There should therefore be no harsh judgement on *Iussit ministris ut implerent eorum saccos tritico* (Gen. xlii, 25) or *Impero sumi arma* (II Macc. xv, 5). The fact is that the two constructions were interchangeable to a considerable extent. In the case of some verbs like *constituo* and verbs of fearing, the infinitive is usual if the subject of the main and subordinate verb is the same, but *ut* is to be used if the subjects are different. Hence we find *Noli timere accipere Mariam conjugem tuam* (Matt. i, 20) but *Timens tribunus ne discerperetur Paulus* (Acts xxiii, 10). This is regular even by Classical standards. It is usual to have an infinitive after *volo*, whether the subjects be the same or not, but the subjunctive, with or without *ut*, is found in Classical authors. So too in the Vulgate: *Ubi vis paremus tibi comedere Pascha?* (Matt. xxvi, 17), *Volo ut, ubi sum ego, et illi sint mecum* (John, xvii, 24).

There are a great number of such expressions which usually take one of the two constructions but are sometimes found, even in Classical authors, with the other. It can be safely said that in Church Latin both constructions are more freely used. We find, for example, both *Faciam ut in praeceptis meis ambuletis* (Ezech. xxxvi, 27) and *Faciam vos fieri pescatores hominum* (Mark i, 17). There is no point in multiplying examples. In some cases where only one construction is found in Classical Latin, the Vulgate has both. It has, for instance, *Decebat ut nobis esset pontifex* (Heb. vii, 26) where Classical Latin would use an infinitive, and it has *Necesse est et hunc habere aliquid* (Heb. vii, 3) where Classical Latin would use *ut*. Verbs of asking and advising are occasionally used with the infinitive instead of *ut*: *Rogavit eum a terra reducere pusillum* (Luke v, 3). In short, the reader of Church Latin should always be prepared for either construction.

So far, mention has been made only of noun clauses. Use of

the infinitive gained ground, not only as an alternative to noun clauses with *ut*, but also in quite different constructions. Probably the most important of these was to express purpose. There were various ways in Latin of expressing this, the chief of which was *ut* + Subjunctive. (This was not, of course, a noun clause.) An infinitive was used in early Latin. Although it never appeared in Classical prose, it was used by the poets and reappeared in later prose. Clearly it never disappeared from the spoken language. It is very common in Church Latin: *Venimus adorare eum* (Matt. ii, 2). Words like *impedio* were used with the infinitive, even by Classical writers, although the textbooks say that they are to be followed by *quominus* or *quin*. Hence we have: *Impediebar plurimum venire ad vos* (Rom. xv, 22). In Classical Latin such words as *spero*, *juro* took Accusative + Infinitive; in Church Latin a simple infinitive is found, besides the construction with *quod*: *Spero autem protinus te videre* (III John, 14); *Juravit Dominus facere vos sibi populum* (I Kings xii, 22). We also find: *Juravit ut non transirem Jordanem* (Deut. iv, 21). Both the infinitive and *ut* are used after *dignus*, though Classical Latin has *qui*: *Non sum dignus vocari apostolus* (I Cor. xv, 9); *Non sum dignus ut solvam ejus corrigiam calceamenti* (John i, 27).

Increase in the use of *ut* is seen to be all the more significant when it is realized that *ut* itself was being replaced by *quod* (and *quia*). We have dealt with the *quod* construction which replaced the Accusative + Infinitive after verbs of saying and feeling. The Accusative + Infinitive already had an alternative in *ut* + Subjunctive after many verbs, so it is not surprising that *quod* should come to be used as an alternative to *ut*. We find Cicero doing this in his letters, which were more colloquial than his formal works: *Accidit perincommodo quod eum nusquam vidisti* (Ep. ad Att. i, 17). *Ut* would have been more elevated, and this, incidentally, is what the Vulgate always has after *accidit*.

The Vulgate has *Non ad te pertinet quia perimus?* (Mark iv, 38) where Classical Latin would have used *ut*. When a noun clause stands in apposition to or explains a noun, *ut* is commonly used: *Nihil imponere vobis oneris quam haec necessaria: ut abstineatis vos ab immolatis* (Acts xv, 28). But we also find *quod* in the same type of clause: *Hoc est autem iudicium: quia lux venit in mundum* (John

iii, 19).¹ A clause of consequence is introduced by *quod* instead of *ut* in Psalm 8: *Quid est homo quod memor es ejus?* The prayer said while putting on the chasuble contains an even clearer example: *Fac ut istud portare sic valeam, quod consequar tuam gratiam.*

The foregoing is bound to be somewhat confusing, because the material itself is. Language can never be cut and dried. A summary in table form may therefore be of help.

Noun clauses after verbs of saying and feeling. Accusative + Infinitive was giving way to a *quod* clause, sometimes to a simple infinitive.

Noun clauses (or the equivalent) *after other verbs or expressions.* These took the infinitive or an *ut* clause, sometimes either at will. There is greater liberty in Church Latin; in other words, each was encroaching on the other's ground.

Adverbial clauses (*i.e. purpose, etc.*). The infinitive was gaining ground, sometimes at the expense of *ut*; *ut* also was gaining some ground.

And all the time *quod* was coming in to replace *ut*.

Thus ground gained by *ut* was ultimately ground gained by *quod*. A situation was building up in which alternative constructions, the infinitive and a clause with *ut*, could be used in a great number of cases. This led eventually to the use of both the infinitive and *quod* for noun and adverbial clauses, foreshadowing modern Romance usage in which the infinitive is used if both the main and the subordinate verb have the same subject and *que, che* is used if they have not, a usage already referred to as being found occasionally in Classical Latin. The somewhat fluid usage of Church Latin is a stage on the road leading to this.

The same state of flux can be discerned in the use of indicative and subjunctive. When *quod* is used for *ut*, the verb is often in the indicative, as in the clause of consequence: *Quo hic iturus est, quia non inveniemus eum?* (John vii, 35). This is Romance, but not Classical usage. Classical writers always used the subjunc-

¹ In this type of clause both the Greek and the Latin allow of translation as either "because" or "namely that". The former is the usual English rendering, but the latter might make better sense. A similar case is John xvi, 9-11: *De peccato quidem: quia non crediderunt in me*, etc.

ive for indirect questions (Ex. I know who he is). Earlier writers had used the indicative, and this evidently held its ground in the spoken language, for it reappears in later writers and is universal in the Romance languages. The Vulgate frequently has indicative: *Nescimus quo vadis* (John xiv, 5). In Classical Latin a subordinate clause in *Oratio Obliqua* was in the subjunctive, whereas in the Vulgate it is usually indicative: *Dicentes se etiam visionem angelorum vidisse, qui dicunt eum vivere* (Luke xxiv, 23).

On the other hand, the Vulgate uses the subjunctive in clauses expressing time and nothing else, where Classical Latin had the indicative: *Dum autem irent emere* (Matt. xxv, 10); *Priusquam te Philippus vocaret* (John i, 48). The conjunction *cum* (whatever its meaning) usually took the Imperfect or Pluperfect Subjunctive to render the so-called "historic" tenses; the Vulgate, alongside *cum autem appropinquaret* (Luke vii, 12), has also *cum illum videbant* (Mark iii, 11). Classical Latin used the indicative in causal clauses if the cause was stated as a fact, subjunctive if it was merely alleged. But we are told that Christ did not trust himself to them, *eo quod ipse nosset omnes* (John ii, 24). Such a subjunctive in a Classical author would mean that he was merely stating Christ's own reason for his action and refraining from asserting its objective validity.

The Classical usage in concessive clauses (i.e. "although" or its equivalent) was indicative if the thing conceded was a fact, subjunctive if it was a supposition; only certain words could be used to introduce each kind. This distinction seems to have disappeared in the Vulgate. Compounds of *si* (*etiamsi*, etc.) continue to take the indicative, but the others take the subjunctive, irrespective of whether it is a statement of fact or not: *Licet enim mortuus sit dominus vester Saul* (II Kings ii, 7), when Saul is known to be dead. *Quamquam*, used only with the indicative in Classical Latin, takes the subjunctive: *Quamquam Jesus non baptizaret* (John iv, 2). This is the usage of the Romance languages, in which all such clauses, fact or not, take the subjunctive.

In fine, the use of subjunctive and indicative is much looser than in Classical authors, and the innovations on the whole lie in the direction of Romance. The translator must watch his step here and not judge the text according to Classical rules. He

must not, for instance, presume that a subjunctive in a causal or concessive clause means that the writer disputes or suspends judgement on its objective truth. St John had no doubt as to Christ's divine omniscience, and his Latin translator knew it when he made *nosset* subjunctive. The same holds good for clauses expressing time and nothing else; the translator must not think that the subjunctive implies a motive or something similar. In Classical Latin *priusquam te Philippus vocaret* would mean that our Lord meant to forestall Philip in some way.

The foregoing is an outline of the most important features of Church Latin syntax which differ from Classical Latin. There are many other differences of less importance, but one must suffice here. The ablative of the gerund is used instead of the present participle: *Pertransiit benefaciendo et sanando* (Acts x, 38)—went about doing good and healing. This, the very form used by present-day Italian in similar contexts, is frequent in the Scripture of sixteen centuries ago. We must see Church Latin as what it is: the somewhat fluid language, in which the Classical constructions are still correct but so are the new ones; a state of transition, as far as the written language is concerned, between Classical Latin and Romance.

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NOTES ON RECENT WORK

THE CHURCH AND UNITY

DR MASCALL'S latest book, *The Recovery of Unity: A Theological Approach*,¹ contains much that is familiar. Themes and ideas that we have come to associate with his pen reappear here. The book is none the worse for that, and it must be recommended as useful reading to all who are interested in ecumenical questions. It is not offered as a finished treatise but as a contribution to present discussions, and it has the character of a topical survey. Lucidly and with urbanity, the author goes

¹ Pp. xiii + 242. (Longmans, 25s.)

over a number of issues, analyses with comment some relevant recent writing and gives his own criticisms and constructive reflexions on the various points covered. In this way we are taken pleasantly through such matters as the mediaeval legacy in Reformation and post-Reformation thought, the Reports on their respective traditions issued some years back by the Anglo-Catholic, the Anglican Evangelical and the Free Church groups, the position of the Eastern Orthodox, the rediscovery of the liturgy and the doctrine of the Church's ministry. A mixed bag, but the items are united by their ecumenical relevance.

The newest part of the book is the last two chapters on the Church and the Papacy—where perhaps there is less urbanity and more pungency. Dr Mascall's attitude to the Papacy can be put briefly: he "finds no difficulty in accepting" the teaching that Christ conferred a primacy on Peter to be transmitted to his successors who are the Bishops of Rome, but he repudiates the interpretation of that primacy maintained by Catholics. He cannot admit that "the primacy involves the absolute supremacy in governing and teaching the Church which is commonly claimed by popes and expounded by Roman Catholic theologians at the present day" (p. 197). He gives his reasons for this view, and concludes by lamenting the fact that not only has the Church had imposed on it a Papacy unknown to the early centuries, but it has also been deprived of a Papacy such that they had and we should have.

A book like this calls for numerous comments. To read it pencil in hand is to be left with many jottings. Is it better to say a little about many points or more about one point? The latter seems preferable because it is more likely to be fruitful. As Dr Mascall observes, our differences lie deeper than is generally supposed, and this makes the attempt to deepen our understanding of key issues a more urgent task than the pursuit of wide-ranging but superficial discussions. This, too, is the more eirenic approach, because it enables us to surmount certain inadequacies in the way our own position is often presented and understood. Although the remarks offered here make no claim to any great depth, they are then an attempt to elucidate a single topic. I hope the impression will not be given of dismissing cavalierly the other important points in Dr Mascall's book.

The topic chosen is the relationship of the Church to unity of faith. Are we to conceive the unity of the Church as resulting from doctrinal unity or as prior to it? Are all Catholics agreed in doctrine because the Church is one, or is the Church one because all agree in holding the same doctrine? This is not a minor issue but a basic one. What is at stake is the necessary function of the Church as a visible community in mediating Christian faith. It is only in and through the Church as the visible community which stems from Christ and is animated by His Spirit that the faith of the Christian can exist in its fullness. It is the community in its wholeness and in its unity that ensures the integral possession and transmission of the Christian message. Our doctrinal unity exists because the Church is one, not vice versa. The integral unity of faith presupposes the unity of Church.

At the very beginning of his book, Dr Mascall expresses his conviction that the fundamental problem of Christian unity is a theological one. Taken in its immediate context, this statement has an acceptable meaning that a Catholic must heartily endorse; namely, it rejects the purely pragmatic approach of those who wish to get together without delay and bypass the theological issues. Rightly such an approach is declared impossible. We are divided in doctrine and no genuine Christian unity can be other than doctrinal. Questions of doctrine are unavoidable, and there must be discussion of these on the deepest level if Christians are to be united once more. In that sense Christian unity is fundamentally a theological problem.

But Dr Mascall, I think, means more by this than a Catholic would. For him we must and can achieve doctrinal unity by theological discussions. We must thrash out our differences, discuss theological questions as profoundly as we can, overcome the uncriticized assumptions that burden us from the past and we shall achieve a unity of doctrine that will prepare the way for ecclesiastical unity. "Before we can achieve ecclesiastical unity we must achieve theological unity, and before we can achieve theological unity we must drastically examine our theology" (p. xi). At first sight nothing could seem more plausible, but it assumes that through a sound theology we shall be able to rebuild the unity of the Church. It is this claim to create

the visible unity of the Church of Christ, the Messianic community on earth, that a Catholic cannot accept.

This refusal is familiar. What follows from it? That Christians have not to harmonize their faith by theological discussions and then establish themselves as a community of believers but to receive the one faith in and through the visible unity of the community established by Christ. It is even true to say that the key division between Christians is not their doctrinal differences but the division of association. It is the division of association, the break with the Church, that gives a doctrinal difference its power to destroy unity of faith and makes and perpetuates it as a heresy. The basic question always remains this: have we to set about creating an association of believers by harmonizing their beliefs or does a Christ-given community already exist in order to mediate its corporate faith to men?

It would be possible to make much of the great difficulty of achieving a sufficient theological unity and of the extreme precariousness of it if ever achieved. Theologians have argued some points for centuries without coming near to resolving their differences. Is there any reason to suppose that the many doctrinal differences underlying the divisions of Christendom will ever be overcome simply by theological discussions? And suppose it were achieved, what would prevent it being lost again after a short duration? It might indeed be retorted that such remarks show an undue pessimism about theological progress and neglect the role of the Holy Spirit, who is surely working to bring about the union of Christians. Certainly, no one would wish to give the impression of undervaluing the immense contribution that can be made by eirenic theological discussions. But can the unity of the Church be made dependent on theology? Is not rather theology dependent on the unity of the Church? To ask this is to see the objection to Dr Mascall's approach.

Community of faith means more than similarity in faith. When Christ established the Church, He set up a community with a corporate faith. It is in and through the corporate existence and life of that community that the Christian faith is continued and brought to men. Unity of faith demands the visible unity of the Church as a community. Outside of that, there will be but a similarity of belief, partially and precariously achieved

from time to time. The weakness of the Anglo-Catholic position is that it cannot do justice to the role of the Church in the economy of faith. In the last analysis the Anglo-Catholic cannot avoid a Protestant ecclesiology. He believes that the Church is in some sense visibly one and that this unity comes from Christ; but he has, as he can, to reconcile this belief with an acceptance of the fact of a divided Church. This antinomy in his position prevents the proper appreciation of the visible unity of the Church as the means of ensuring unity of faith among Christians. This function of the Church is slurred over by remarks about the excessive stress placed by Catholics on the juridical aspect of the Church or by the emotive use of words such as "organization". But this is to cloud the issue. Even before jurisdiction or the *magisterium* is mentioned the unsoundness of the Anglican view becomes apparent. Anglicans cannot maintain the unity of the Church in the obvious sense of one undivided community. There is in fact no unity of association in the Church as they recognize it. They must hold that there are several Christian communities, communities severed from each other, with no unity of association between them. How then can there be a corporate faith? How can the Church as a visible community mediate one faith to its members?

What is being upheld here is this. It was not the intention of Christ that we possess the faith as isolated individuals or in separate groups but as members of one community. Unity of faith does not mean simply that we all have a similar faith and believe the same truths; our faith is a corporate or communal faith. It is derived from and dependent upon our membership of a community. The faith of the community is the rule of faith for the individual believer; the faith of each Christian must be measured against the faith of the Church. The fullness of Christ's message is possessed and preserved, not by the individual as such, however learned, but by the Church as a community. The individual Christian must purify and perfect his faith by thinking with the Church. How topsy-turvy to put doctrinal unity first and see it as a means towards ecclesiastical unity! Yet, what else can be done, if there is not a sufficiently clear and consistent conception of the visible unity of the Church to leave it at all effective in ensuring a unity of faith?

When Dr Mascall examines the distortions and mistaken assumptions that he considers as common to the theological thinking of all the Christian traditions, what is lacking in his analysis? It is the recognition that there is in the visible Church an unfailing corporate faith which must be the rule of belief for each Christian. How can one maintain that all Christian groups are equally in a doctrinal morass, from which all must try to emerge by theological discussion, without equivalently denying this truth: that Christ left one visible community, promising indefectibility to its corporate faith and doing so precisely because in this way the fullness of His revelation would remain present to each age and be mediated to all men? Admittedly, fashionable intellectual trends can obscure even Christian truth in the minds of men, but are we in the last resort dependent on the sagacity and learning of theologians for our discernment of the true teaching of Christ?

There is a distinction, and it is a very traditional one, between inadequate theology within the Church and the aberrant thought of those who refuse to think with the Church. There has been and is much wrong thinking within the Church, and the nominalist theology of the late Middle Ages is a conspicuous example, but what makes a heresy is the will to continue in one's own thought even in opposition to the faith of the Church. Although in a given age certain Christian truths may be generally neglected and obscured in the minds of the majority of the faithful, and theologians may distort what they are endeavouring to expound, what is truly the universal faith of the Church, what is genuinely the corporate belief of its members, always remains the integral and uncontaminated teaching of Christ. That is what is demanded by a Catholic view of the Church.

The same defect in Dr Mascall's thinking reappears when he criticizes the Catholic attitude to the *magisterium*. He sees that the practical attitude of the Catholic believer to the teaching of the Church cannot be explained merely in terms of the juridical binding force of individual decrees, but he does not seem to perceive the basis of the more generous docility of the Catholic. That basis is the conviction that the corporate faith of the Church is of unfailing truth.

The fullness of the Christian revelation is preserved and transmitted in the corporate faith of the Church. The Christian does not live his life of faith as an isolated individual. He has his faith as a member incorporated into the Church of Christ. To the extent that the individual unites himself to the communal faith he cannot go astray, and in union with that faith lies the source of any genuine renewal and advance of his own faith. If that is so, is it surprising that both the ordinary faithful and theologians in the Catholic Church feel impelled to think with the Church and to treasure every sign of its corporate faith, even when the *magisterium* has not been led to issue any infallible decree? *Sentire cum Ecclesia*. That is the law of Catholic thinking. The duty of the Catholic in this respect does not cease when he has measured the precise degree of assent demanded by a particular decree. No ordinary believer has the right to impose his insights on others, and hence it is always necessary to determine the exact juridical force attached by authority to particular decisions; but the primary concern of the Catholic is the wider one of uniting himself as closely as possible to the faith of the Church. He is well aware that the different means and signs for declaring and discerning this corporate faith vary in their force. But he is guided here not merely by external decrees but also by the Holy Spirit, and his basic conviction is that there is but one corporate faith in the one Church of Christ and that this faith is always the truth of Christ in its undiminished integrity.

In parenthesis, we may note that many Anglicans might well say that they admit a general Catholic consciousness or a possession of Catholic truth by Christendom as a whole. Their view, however, must remain radically defective, because they are unable to maintain the existence of a genuine visible community. Consequently, any talk of a general Catholic faith disappears into vagueness. There cannot be a corporate faith and a corporate testimony to that faith where there is not one undivided community. A Christian cannot live his faith in union with the Church and conform his faith to that of the Church if the Church is broken up into a number of separate communities; even less so when these proclaim different doctrines. A living unity of faith demands that the Church be united as one community.

What then is the root issue between Dr Mascall and our-

selves? It is not, as he thinks, a particular interpretation of the *magisterium*. That question comes in the second place; that is, after one has recognized the oneness and indefectibility of the Church of Christ and proceeds then to investigate its structure and its organs. The fundamental issue is the ever-enduring presence of the integral revelation of Christ in the faith of a visible community that stems from Him and is still united to Him in the Holy Spirit. Is there a visible community in which men are associated together in the profession of one faith and which is so united to Christ that the corporate profession of faith always and without fail preserves and transmits the fullness of His message? That there is such a community is the Catholic contention. It is the Church, the Messianic community, the new People of God. Such a belief is incompatible with the idea of restoring the doctrinal unity of Christ's Church by theological discussion as a means towards the later establishment of ecclesiastical unity.

The same point may be made in another way. What is genuine teaching of Christ? It is the present belief and teaching of the Church, is the Catholic reply. That question is a theological problem, replies Dr Mascall; the genuine Christian tradition must be disentangled from the distortions it has suffered in the traditions of the different Christian denominations; at best our task of disengagement can have but a relative success, but the situation is at present more hopeful than before, because our theology has become much sounder; in a sound theology lies also the way to the recovery of Christian unity. Surely, what is at stake here is the conception of the Church of Christ and of its function in bringing faith to men.

After criticism, the task of a more positive analysis must not be shirked. What then is the role of the Church in the faith of its members? The Church with its authority is not the motive of our faith. Let that be clear. Faith is a theological virtue, and that means it enables us to encounter God. God alone is the motive of faith; we believe because in our act of faith we rest upon God as Truth. Whichever of the many explanations of faith is preferred, it is beyond doubt that nothing less than the uncreated Truth of God, present in some way to the mind, moves us when we assent to the divine message. That is the

nature of an act of divine faith. It remains essentially the same when it is mediated by the Church and is called divine and Catholic faith. Why then does the Church intervene?

To answer this it is first necessary to see the way God offers Himself to the mind in faith. The Christian message comes from without in the form of an external testimony, marked with the signs of its divine origin. There is indeed an action of God on the mind, enlightening it so that it recognizes in the external testimony the presence and voice of God. Nevertheless, it is only in and through the external testimony that God makes Himself known to the person and solicits his act of faith. The structure of signs through which the message is externally presented is used by God as the place and means of His self-disclosure. Now, the role of the Church is to provide a permanent and general testimony to the revelation of God in Christ. This testimony of the Church, it is important to note, is not a substitute for the divine disclosure itself—our faith remains divine and involves a personal encounter with God; but the teaching of the Church is where God presents Himself to the mind and calls for its faith. In brief, the testimony of the Church is the condition of our motive of faith. It is that in and through which God offers Himself to us for our acceptance.

This role of the Church as the general and permanent witness of the divine revelation simply continues the role of Christ. When God became man, He became present to men in Christ in such a way that the thought and teaching of the man Jesus was the thought and teaching of God. To believe Christ was to believe God. In His human nature, He was the instrument of divine revelation. To mould one's thought on Him was to mould one's thought on the thought of God. The Church, the Body of Christ, has to fulfil a similar function. The Church continues Christ as the general witness to the Christian revelation. To conform one's thought to the thought and testimony of the Church is to conform one's thought to God. Not that the Church is now in the place of God, but that God is present in the Church, making Himself known through the Church, using the Church as the instrument by means of which He offers Himself in the same revelation He made in Christ.

Christ left His followers visibly associated together. They

continued to live a corporate life, possessing and developing their own institutions in accordance with the teaching He had given them. They were a society, a Church, forming in their association the new People of God. Christ had promised to be with them. He had sent them His Spirit. He had sanctioned beforehand as His own the teaching and authority of this Church. As Paul saw, the Church was the Body of Christ. Its unity transcended that of all merely human groups. All its members were united through baptism and the Eucharist with the risen body of Christ, the source from which salvation flows to men. The effects of these sacraments might be impeded in individual men, but the existence of the Church as a corporate entity was assured. How could it fail? This Church in what it is and believes and teaches is the permanent embodiment of the Christian revelation. This Church is Christ present to each age in what He was and what He taught.

This community, enjoying an unbroken life in Christ through the Spirit, possesses the truth of Christ. The Church preserves through the centuries the Christian revelation in its fullness. The revelation it has now is one and the same with the revelation that was given in its entirety already in the apostolic age; and it remains unchanged. Age differs from age in its understanding and appreciation of the riches of this revelation, and since there is an unbroken continuity in the Church there is a doctrinal progress as successive generations display its contents and develop their implications. But no new object is ever added by God to this deposit of truth given once and for all in Christ. That does not mean, however, that revelation ceases to be a present reality and becomes a mere historical tradition. We do not encounter the saving Word of God only indirectly by trying to bridge the gap of long centuries of history. That Word is present to us here and now. God is present in that deposit of truth in the Church to make it His living message. When the teaching of Christ is handed on by the testimony of the Church, God is there in that testimony and makes it His own. He uses the witness of the Church as the means whereby He offers each man His message of salvation, together with His Truth to motivate the acceptance.

The role of the Church in possessing and bearing testimony

to the revelation of Christ cannot be limited to the *magisterium* and its activity. There is no need to repeat here the Catholic teaching on the *magisterium*. Like all communities, the community of Christ has its structure. What that structure is Scripture and tradition show us. Christ established a hierarchical society. In the service of the community, the apostles and their successors were given a power and an authority not possessed by the other members. To affirm the existence of a *magisterium* in the Church is to affirm that the bishops alone in the community have the function of proclaiming authoritatively the message of Christ and of judging its content. Expositions of this doctrine are readily available. What is more to the point here is to stress that the function of the *magisterium*, its teaching and juridical authority, cannot be properly understood unless attention is first given to that general task of testifying to its faith which belongs to the entire Church as the visible community of Christ. The *magisterium* undoubtedly has the principal place in the Church when this is considered under that aspect by which it is the permanent witness in the world to the teaching of Christ. This follows from the structure Christ gave to His Church. But the principal part is not the whole, and it is the failure to put the *magisterium* in its setting that leads to such frequent misunderstanding of the Catholic position.

There has been in recent Catholic theology, chiefly under the influence of Billot, a tendency to identify tradition with the *magisterium*. This is regrettable, because the older approach, represented for example by Franzelin, which gave a wider meaning to tradition, is far sounder. It is perhaps necessary to recall here that tradition for Catholic theology is not merely an historical memory helped by documents. No doubt, tradition in the Church always refers to the past because what is handed down from generation to generation is ever the same revelation, preserved intact and without addition by the Holy Spirit. And such continuity means that documents which give evidence of the past faith and teaching of the Church always retain their value and remain part of the Christian faith. But tradition is primarily something of the present. In its first sense it is the actual witness of the Church to the revelation of Christ present within it. The truth of Christ is handed on by the testimony of

the Church. This tradition preserves and perpetuates the faith of the Church; through it the individual members can grow in faith according to their union with the Church; by it the message of Christ is transmitted to all men. In so far as tradition implies an authoritative proclamation of Christian doctrine and an authorized judgement concerning it, it belongs exclusively to the *magisterium* in the Church. Nevertheless, despite the outstanding importance of this organ of tradition, it has not the only part to play. All Christians in varying ways bear witness to the faith of the Church and the tradition of the Church embraces this witness. The fact that the members of the Church are dependent upon the *magisterium* in matters of faith does not mean that their function is restricted to a passive reception of the teaching of the hierarchy. The Holy Spirit dwells within the members of the Church. Their faith is a personal reality. By living a life of faith, they can pass on the faith to some, help the faith of others and by the insights granted to them enrich the life of faith within the Church. The hierarchy of the Church has from Christ the commission to teach and the authority to judge in all doctrinal matters, but its existence and its function are only meaningful within a community of which the corporate faith and life were intended by God to be the permanent presence and revelation of Christ in each age.

The same communal setting must be kept in mind if one is to understand the teaching on the infallibility of the *magisterium*. The best approach to this question is through the infallibility in believing that belongs to the Church. On the one hand the infallibility in teaching presupposes this infallible faith and on the other hand it is directed towards it as a means of ensuring it. What then comes first is the truth that the Church of Christ must be indefectible in its faith. Whatever may be the lapses of individual members, the Church as a whole, the Church as the visible community of Christ, cannot fail in its faith. If it did, how could we regard it as the Body of Christ and the Messianic community? The promises of God would indeed have been made void. Basic in the Catholic conception of the Church must be its indefectible faith. How then does God secure this infallibility of belief? Well, in the first place by the Spirit of God dwelling within the Church and its members. The Spirit must

come first, and it is an undue limitation of the action of the Spirit within the Church to describe the infallibility of belief simply as a passive infallibility in relation to the *magisterium*. Nevertheless, by reason of the structure Christ gave to His Church, the infallibility promised to the *magisterium*, to the universal episcopate as a body and to the Pope in his personal office as the Vicar of Christ, is of outstanding importance in keeping intact the faith of the Church. There is no need to analyse here the Catholic teaching on the infallibility of the *magisterium*. The purpose of these remarks is to show the close relationship between the activity of the *magisterium* and the corporate faith and witness of the Church.

It has just been said that under one aspect the infallible teaching of the Church presupposes the infallible faith of the Church. The *magisterium* exists in order to teach and interpret the faith held by the Church. How could it do otherwise than presuppose that faith? It receives no new revelation; the doctrine it must proclaim and judge is the one deposit of faith unceasingly possessed by the Church. The holders of the *magisterium* must find out that faith by reflexion and investigation. That is patent from the manner in which any papal or conciliar decree is prepared. But here an error lurks that must be avoided. It is fear of it that leads Catholics to separate unduly the *magisterium* from the corporate faith and witness of the Church. Let us exorcise that fear. What has been said does not mean that the decrees of the *magisterium* are dependent on the consent of the Church. The judgements of the teaching authority are immediately binding in their several degrees of force; they do not wait upon the approval of the Church. The Pope and the bishops do not derive their authority from below as representatives of the Church but from above as representatives of Christ. Their power comes from on high; it does not arise from the members of the Church. What remains true is that it is given by Christ in an organic relationship with the Church and its faith. What the bishops receive is the authority, divinely guaranteed as infallible under certain conditions, to express the faith that has existed within the Church since the apostolic age and will continue to do so unchanged until the end of time. To make the statements of the *magisterium* subject

to the judgement of the faithful would not be a simple affirmation of its organic connexion with the Church; it would be to deny the existence in any real sense of that *magisterium*.

Shall we put it in this way? The faith of the Church is permanent. It is handed down by an unbroken tradition, in which the authoritative teaching of the *magisterium* has the principal but not the only place. Again and again in the course of time the question must arise: what is the faith of the Church? A dispute has started, a new problem has been posed, and an answer is demanded concerning the meaning of Christian revelation. How is that question answered? Catholic belief in the hierarchy and the papacy means that, according to the structure of the Church as established by Christ, such questions are answered finally, not by any vote of the members of the Church, whether of the learned or of the holy or of all, but authoritatively by the decision of the apostolic hierarchy; and further, that in the episcopal body the Pope's decision is essential and self-sufficient. To hold this is not to isolate the hierarchy from the Church; it is simply to believe in the promise of Christ that its definitive decision will always be in conformity with the truth of Christ; that is, in accord with the perennial faith of the Church. The *magisterium* is not made a source of fresh truth, acting without any dependence on the mind of the Church, but a means, infallibly guaranteed by God and hence of unquestionable authority, whereby the faith of the Church is expressed.

The drift of these remarks may be shown more clearly by considering the personal position of the Pope as a Christian believer and member of the Church. Dr Mascall makes this objection to Catholic doctrine:

The Papal theory in fact divides the members of the Church into two entirely distinct classes: one which is continually bound by duty of unquestioning obedience, and one which is subject to no earthly control. The fact that the latter consists of only one member does not alter the fact of this dichotomy; it makes the Pope's membership of the Church different in kind from that of every other member. It makes him alone among Christians incapable of the supreme act of ecclesiastical loyalty, namely of willing submission to the Roman Pontiff, for no man can make an act of submission to himself (p. 209).

This is a caricature. Take first the Pope's act of faith. As an act of divine and Catholic faith, it does not differ from the act of faith of the ordinary Catholic. His faith is mediated, like ours, by the living testimony of the Church. The Pope must humbly and docilely believe, as we believe, what he discerns to be the faith of the Church. He knows that he is divinely guided in his teaching office, but does that mean that his act of faith is independent of the Church? No; accepting Christ's Church to be indefectible in its faith, he conforms his faith to that faith. In the very exercise of his teaching office he endeavours to discern and present that faith. Those efforts, he realizes, have a divine guarantee attached to their results, but that does not take away the duty of making them. And we, on our part, know that God does not allow any shortcomings in the occupant of the Holy See to interfere with the truth of what he definitively imposes on the belief of the Church. The faith of every Christian, Pope as well as peasant, finds its measure in that deposit of truth unfailingly possessed by the Church and manifested in the unbroken continuity of its life and teaching as the community of Christ.

The Pope's supreme jurisdiction is not part of the theme selected for consideration here. It must be enough to point out that all jurisdiction in the Church is closely connected with its faith. It reflects the faith of the Church; it is the guiding of the members of the Church according to the teaching of the faith and to the ends placed before them by faith. The Pope has his teaching and governing authority in order to make clear what is involved in the faith of the Church and to apply this to the circumstances of each time. It must be said again that the hierarchy and the Pope do not derive their authority from below as the representatives of the Church in any democratic sense but from Christ as His representatives; and in this respect there is no authority on earth higher than the Pope. But the divine assistance is promised for the government as well as for the teaching of the Church, and this ensures that the human element in the hierarchy is never allowed to injure in any essential way the structure and the mission of the Church. What must always be remembered in considering the Catholic claims for the hierarchy and the papacy is that the promise of unfailing

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divine assistance is an assurance of the permanent organic oneness of these with the Church. The promise removes and does not bring any threat of isolation from the Church. If then one must speak of a "supreme act of ecclesiastical loyalty", this is undoubtedly the act of submission to the Church as the Body of Christ, and this is found in the Pope as well as in all the other members of the Church. But clearly the expression of that loyalty to the Church and the duties it involves will be determined by each person's place in that organically structured community which is the Body of Christ.

To bring now these lengthy remarks to a conclusion. It may be freely admitted that Catholic theologians in their anxiety to defend the truth concerning the *magisterium* have often neglected to treat the other aspects that make clear its organic relationship to the Church. But that relationship has always been a part of Catholic doctrine. It is found in the repeated denial that the *magisterium* receives any new revelation. Again and again it has been stressed that the function of the *magisterium* is to preserve and transmit the one revelation of Christ, the unchanging deposit of faith. That deposit of faith for Catholics does not belong simply to the past but is a permanent living reality in the Church. The corporate universal faith of the Church is at all times integral and indefectible. And although this may seem paradoxical to Anglicans, it is precisely all this that has been brought into relief by the definition of the Assumption of our Lady, with its reliance on the actual faith of the Church.

The defect in Dr Mascall's account is of a different order of seriousness. What he fails to give us is the Church as a visible community. The attempt to drive a wedge between the sacramental and the administrative (does not tradition reckon with the possibility of a schismatic bishop?) and the endeavour to soften the impact of a divided Church on earth by an appeal to a hierarchy in heaven do not obscure the fact that he is compelled to deny the existence of a visible association of men with a corporate faith and a corporate life which has enjoyed an indefectible continuity as the Church of Christ and serves as the unfailing embodiment and presence of His revelation in the world. What is at stake between us, I repeat, is not a particular

interpretation of the *magisterium* or the papacy, but the very nature of the Church.

Some books on kindred themes may be briefly mentioned. Dr Mascall entitles his book *The Recovery of Unity*. The basic difference between his and the Catholic conception of the Church may be brought out by placing against this title these remarks of the Abbot of Downside on the Catholic concept of reunion: "it is not the creation of a non-existent unity, it is the rediscovery by those who return of that unity which already exists". This quotation is taken from the excellent introduction he has contributed to Mr John M. Todd's *Catholicism and the Ecumenical Movement*.¹ This latter is a lively little book, and it is good to see a layman thinking about and discussing such matters. The author is quite modest in his claims. He offers us "not a thorough survey" but "part of a conversation". What is given is a personal viewpoint. The main theme of the book is that the non-Catholic bodies have developed many traditions and customs that are good and capable of being embodied in the Church and indeed of enriching its life. Some account is given of the discussions that have taken place concerning the extent to which such a thesis may be maintained. He then applies this general principle to the concrete situation in this country with its non-Catholic Christian traditions. Pleasantly informative on the ecumenical movement and stimulating in some of its observations, the book remains on the superficial level. This gives it an optimistic tone that is unrealistic. Its value will be to provoke interest among Catholics in these questions rather than to provide any serious contribution to ecumenical problems.

Those who want succinct factual data about the ecumenical movement—what it is all about? what has happened? where do Catholics stand?—will find it in *A Catholic Primer on the Ecumenical Movement* by Fr Gustave Weigel.² This is the first of the *Woodstock Papers*, and it provides an opportunity to extend a warm welcome to a new theological series, edited by the Jesuits of Woodstock College in the United States. "Less substantial than a book, less superficial than a lecture", the kind of occasional theological paper envisaged for inclusion in the

¹ Pp. xiv + 111, Longmans. 6s. 6d.

² Pp. x + 79, The Newman Press. 95 c.

series should gain and instruct a wide public. Fr Weigel's account of the ecumenical movement is lucid and informative; his theological reflexions are good, without however being profound. Useful for those who want to know but are in a hurry. It is a much more attractive survey than *Le mouvement œcuménique: efforts faits pour réaliser l'union ou le rapprochement des Eglises chrétiennes* by P. Arminjon.¹ This is an arid little book. The bones of fact have not been enflamed and quickened.

Study of the ecumenical movement is impossible without frequent recourse to the relevant documents. That is why Dr Bell has done such a useful work in gathering these together in his *Documents on Christian Unity*. A new volume has recently appeared, covering the period 1948–57.² It is of exceptional interest, because this has been a momentous period and the documents from it are of outstanding importance. Among them are the Instruction of the Holy Office on the Ecumenical Movement, the first documents from the World Council of Churches, which held its inaugural assembly at Amsterdam in 1948, and a further selection of those concerning the Church of South India. The editor has written a short introduction in which he surveys the period, 1920–58, covered by the four volumes so far published. A book that is truly indispensable.

The ecumenical movement embraces two different kinds of effort among non-Catholic Christians. The first is the desire and search for the unity of the Churches, and the second is the attempt to elucidate and make effective the social implications of the Christian faith. This latter movement, often less noted by Catholics, was represented by the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work, which was one of the parents of the World Council of Churches. Fr Duff, a Jesuit, has made this second aspect of the ecumenical movement the subject of a major study.³ He has given us a scholarly dissertation based on a thorough research into all the relevant documents, but it is readable enough to be recommended to anyone who is interested in the attitude of the various Christian Churches to social and

¹ Pp. 96, Lethielleux, Paris. 375 fr.

² *Documents on Christian Unity. Fourth Series, 1948–57.* Edited by G. K. A. Bell. Pp. xviii + 243, Oxford University Press. Cloth, 21s.; Paper, 10s. 6d.

³ *The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches.* By Edward Duff, S.J. Pp. xii + 339, Longmans. 25s.

international questions. The history of the World Council is outlined and its nature and authority as a body discussed. Then comes a most instructive section on the different fundamental attitudes to social questions represented at the Council. The author makes no theological claims for his work, but this section shows how doctrinal and theological differences are reflected in these more practical matters. The whole question is further clarified in an appendix on the "Catholic" and "Protestant" emphases as found in the World Council; these two tendencies represent two very different ways of conceiving Christian faith and life. After these more theoretical problems have been discussed, Fr Duff examines the social policy of the World Council and analyses the actual positions adopted in this field. The conclusions of the investigation are then drawn, and the work closes with a bibliography and an index. The book is a useful, well-documented study, which should be of great value to social students and is of interest to the theologian also.

"There must today be more Catholic study of non-Catholic positions," says Fr Weigel in the brochure mentioned above. Some time ago, he himself showed the way with his booklet, *A Survey of Protestant Theology in Our Day*.¹ In it he complains that Catholic theologians and manuals spend their time on the early Reformers and their views and leave our students in ignorance of present-day Protestant thought. Everyone will recognize the truth of this, though it must in fairness be remembered that the original Protestant theology must be examined carefully for the understanding of the Tridentine decrees. That does not take away the need for contact with living Protestant thought, and this brief outline, dealing with writers such as Barth, Brunner and Tillich, can serve as a helpful first glimpse. But even for the understanding of modern Protestant thinking, a knowledge of the great Reformation figures remains indispensable. Students have been assisted in this respect by two selections of texts in translation, published in the series *Textes pour l'histoire sacrée*, under the general editorship of Daniel-Rops. The first is devoted to Luther and the second to Calvin.² In

¹ Pp. 58, The Newman Press. 90 c.

² *Luther tel qu'il fut*, pp. 256; *Calvin tel qu'il fut*, pp. 253, Arthème Fayard, Paris. 600 fr. each.

both volumes the texts are translated and edited with an introduction and brief notes by Chanoine Cristiani. A mistake in the title-page of the second gives the impression that Calvin wrote in German.

The task of the theologian is to grapple with the thought of the great Protestant thinkers, both of the past and of the present. What those whose apostolate is more active often look for is some manual of information on the many Protestant sects. There is Algermissen's *Christian Denominations*.¹ But that is a bulky tome, and probably something less thoroughly doctrinal and more schematically factual would not be unwelcome. For America, such a work has been produced by Fr Hardon in *The Protestant Churches of America*.² It gives a reasonably detailed account of the history, doctrine, ritual and organization of the fifteen major Protestant bodies in the States. Then the other one hundred and eighty or so are briefly dealt with in groups.

Accuracy of facts is the concern of Fr Hardon; insight is the predominant aim of another book of a quite different approach. What M. Jean Séguy tries to do in *Les sectes protestantes dans la France contemporaine*³ is to determine the origin, meaning and importance of "le phénomène sectaire". He accepts Algermissen's distinction between a church and a sect. A church exists for mankind in general; it embraces the multitude, both sinners and saints. A sect is a special and separate group of elect, a voluntary group of the converted; hence it is always strongly individualistic in character. The conclusion that emerges from the author's analysis of the history and spirituality of sects is that the phenomenon of sectarianism is independent of both Protestantism and Catholicism; it is a reality on its own. The Catholic Middle Ages produced sects and the modern Churches issuing from the Reformation have done so. The characteristics of this phenomenon are outlined. This book has a much wider interest than its title indicates.

To return once more to Anglicanism. What is important is our personal contact with individuals. Books usually only generalize and persons never fit into our classifications and

¹ St Louis and London, 1946. See THE CLERGY REVIEW, 37 (1952), pp. 757-9.

² Pp. xxiii + 365, The Newman Press. \$5.

³ Pp. 294, Beauchesne, Paris.

categories. Dom Aldhelm Dean had occasion to help many Anglicans by letter. With the permission of their original recipients, he offers a selection of these letters to a wider public.¹ It is not easy to comment on a book of this kind. Many will find the letters too long and wordy in their explanations and advice. Without the introduction, many would judge them to be made-up rather than actual letters. Those who want to gain an insight into the Anglican mentality would do far better to read the excellent article, "Authority and the Anglican Mind", by Fr Henry St John in a recent number of *Blackfriars*.² May our efforts at understanding and our prayers lead many to a rediscovery of unity.

CHARLES DAVIS

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

PAPAL BLESSING AFTER A RETREAT

Can any priest give the Papal Blessing after preaching a Retreat of six days or more? (A. E. H.)

REPLY

This is a question which comes up periodically.³ The answer is in the negative; that is to say, no priest is empowered to bestow the Papal Blessing, with or without plenary indulgence, by the mere fact that he has preached a Retreat or Mission, whatever its duration. A special faculty from the Holy See is always required. Many religious Orders and Congregations have obtained such a faculty for all their members who preach a Retreat or Mission of a certain duration;⁴ and it is doubtless

¹ *Letters to Anglicans*. Pp. 62, Burns Oates. 5s.

² June 1958, pp. 242-60.

³ Cf. THE CLERGY REVIEW, April 1940, p. 343; August 1940, p. 164; October 1944, p. 467.

⁴ Cf. Beringer, *Les Indulgences*, I, nn. 804, 808, 812-16.

their uniform practice which perpetuates the idea that the two things go together. Up to 1 April 1933, some pious associations had the privilege of communicating a similar faculty to their priest-members, and, under the terms of the decree which withdrew such privileges as from that date,¹ those who had already obtained the faculty in this way were not deprived of it, though, if the indult in question were temporary and were not subsequently renewed, their faculty may have lapsed.² Any priest, however, secular or religious, can still obtain the faculty individually, either from the Holy Father (acting in person, or through the Secretariate of State or an Apostolic Delegation), or from the Sacred Penitentiary. The rite to be observed, unless the rescript contains instructions to the contrary, is that given in the Roman Ritual, 1952 edition, tit. IX, cap. X, no. 2, i.e. a sign of the cross with a crucifix, accompanied by the words: "Benedictio Dei omnipotentis, etc."

Priests who lack the faculty may console those to whom they preach Missions or Retreats, by calling their attention to the plenary indulgence granted, under the usual conditions, to those who have devoutly listened to at least a third of the sermons or conferences.³ From this point of view, the Papal Blessing itself would give them no more.

ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL TO A NEW PARISH

What elements are essential to the erection of a new parish? Must the boundaries be defined, with what precision, and by whom? What is the status of existing parishes whose boundaries have never been defined authoritatively? If a defined area is cut off from any other parish and a priest is put in sole charge of it, is it necessarily a parish, and is the priest necessarily a *parochus*? (J. H. and P. J. O'M.)

¹ S. Penitentiary *Consilium suum persequens*, 20 March 1933; *A.A.S.*, 1933, XXV, p. 170.

² No general rule can be safely offered. Enquiries should be addressed in each case to the directorate of the association. Thus, the faculty formerly granted through membership of the Association of Priest-Adorers, *alias* the Priests' Eucharistic League, is stated to have lapsed for all members.

³ *Enchiridion Indulgentiarum*, n. 689, a; n. 692, c.

REPLY

Canon 216, §1: "Territorium cuiuslibet dioecesis dividatur in distinctas partes territoriales; unicuique autem parti sua peculiaris ecclesia cum populo determinata est assignanda, suusque peculiaris rector, tanquam proprius eiusdem pastor, est praeficiendus pro necessaria animarum cura."

§3: "Partes dioecesis de quibus in §1, sunt paroeciae . . ."

(1) It is clear from this canon that four elements are certainly required for the *integral* constitution of a parish, namely, that it be a territorial division of a diocese, distinct from any other such part, that it have a church of its own, that the people it serves be adequately determined, and that a rector be legitimately set over it as its own peculiar and proper pastor with care of souls. Moreover, since, according to Cardinal Gasparri, replying as President of the Code Commission,¹ "a parish is always an ecclesiastical benefice . . . even if, lacking the proper endowment (resources or revenue), it be erected according to the provisions of canon 1415, §3", we can add, as a fifth integral element, that the wherewithal necessary to its viability must be prudently foreseen as forthcoming from some source or other. Nowhere does the law state explicitly that all these elements are necessary to the very essence of a parish; indeed, the contrary is implicit in the practice of the Church and in her decisions regarding certain particular cases.² But neither has it been explicitly declared what is the essential minimum, nor do the commentators commonly attempt to determine it.

Of the few who do, Fanfani is perhaps the clearest and most realistic. He defines a parish materially as "ipsum territorium, certis limitibus circumscripsum, in quo degent fideles addicti alicui sacerdoti ibidem ex officio curam animarum exercenti"; and from this he deduces that three elements are essential to the constitution of a parish, properly so called: "(a) territorium, certis limitibus circumscripsum, quod sit pars dioecesis; (b)

¹ To the Apostolic Delegate, U.S.A., 26 September 1931; Bouscaren, *Canon Law Digest*, I, p. 150.

² Cf. documents in Bouscaren, op. cit., pp. 146-54.

coetus fidelium in supradicto territorio degentium; (c) proprius sacerdos, cum cura animarum".¹

With some diffidence, we suggest that only the first two elements are absolutely essential. The law is at pains to ensure that a parish shall never lack "a priest of its own with care of souls", and clearly a parish cannot function as such, *de facto*, until such a priest is assigned to it; but we incline to the view that a parish is essentially constituted, *de iure*, even before this assignment is made, that is to say, as soon as a territorial part of a diocese, together with the faithful resident in it, is separated by the Ordinary from the territory of any other parish or parishes. To quote Coronata: "semper ac dioecesis in partes dividitur, habetur paroecia."² One might even see confirmation of this conclusion in the fact that the first element in canon 216, §1, territorial division, is separated from the rest by a semicolon, and that the rest are complementary of the first.

Certain it is, at least from regular practice, that the actual possession of a church of its own is not essential to the initial establishment of a parish, just as the complete loss of its church, e.g. by fire or enemy action, does not terminate or even suspend the existence of a parish. The law expressly requires every parish to have its own church, and therefore, once an Ordinary has erected a parish by territorial division, it has both the right and duty to acquire and keep a church of its own, as soon as circumstances allow. Moreover, it is clear that a parish cannot begin to function, unless its pastor has some place, permanent or provisional, in which to exercise his sacred ministry for the benefit of his flock. But it is only in this sense that the teaching of those authors who speak of a church as an essential requirement,³ can be reconciled with the facts. It is more realistic to say, as does Brys (grouping the church and cemetery together): "Haec nec necessaria, nec paroeciae unice propria sunt. Quare

¹ *De Iure Parochorum*, Turin-Rome, 1924, nn. 1-2.

² *Inst. Iuris Canonici*, I, n. 307, footnote 1.—It is to be noted that, shortly after the promulgation of the Code, some Ordinaries in this country obtained an indult authorizing them to retain certain specified areas, not attached to any existing parish, under their direct and immediate control, owing to the difficulty of either erecting them into parishes, or attaching them to existing parishes. To avoid complication we shall take no further account of this exceptional and dwindling group of "missions", which in any case is limited to the areas mentioned by the petitioners.

³ E.g. *Traité de droit canonique*, ed. Naz, I, n. 504: "Quant à la possession d'une église particulière, elle est de l'essence de la paroisse."

nec absolute probant si adsint, nec si desint excludunt paroecialitatem".¹ It is somewhat the same, we suggest, with the "peculiar rector". The Ordinary is canonically bound to provide one, as soon as he cuts off an area and its residents from the charge of the pastor or pastors hitherto responsible for their spiritual care; but, just as a parish would not lose its canonical status if an Ordinary were to neglect to provide it with a pastor of its own in the event of a vacancy, so too, in our opinion, a certain delay in the appointment of a "peculiar rector" does not necessarily prevent a newly cut-off area from acquiring parochial status, at least *de iure*, from the moment when the division is authoritatively complete.²

(2) Some kind of definition of boundaries is intrinsic to the very notion of a "distinct" territorial division, as required by canon 216; and certainly it is necessary for the lawfulness of the erection of a parish that its boundaries be defined with sufficient precision to enable every one of its resident subjects, present and future, to be known with certainty. But it would be difficult to prove that absolute precision is essential to the *valid* erection of a parish, because a certain degree of indeterminacy does not necessarily prevent a separated area from functioning substantially as a parish. We agree therefore with Beste³ that a parish can be validly erected and remain in being, without an *accurate* description of the boundaries, as long as there is a workable rule.

Since determination of the boundaries in some workable fashion is intrinsic to the very act of territorial division by which a parish comes into being, it can only be done with juridical effect by the Ordinary competent to erect the parish, and therefore any determination made by others must at least receive his approval. For the lawfulness of the erection "a decree of the Ordinary is required, defining the boundaries of its territory";⁴ but it is not necessary to the validity.⁵

(3) It follows that, in the case of existing parishes whose

¹ *Iuris Canonici Compendium*, I, n. 389.

² S.C.P.F., 9 December 1920, says of the missionary regions subject to it: "Quae vero territorii partes limitatae iam sunt, vel limitari in posterum contingat ad n.c. 216, eae nomine paroeciae veniunt" (Bouscaren, op. cit., p. 149).

³ *Introductio in Codicem*, Naples, 1956, p. 236.

⁴ S.C. Consist., 1 August 1919; Bouscaren, op. cit., pp. 146-7.

⁵ S.C. Conc., 20 March 1932; Bouscaren, op. cit., p. 152

boundaries have never been expressly defined by decree of the local Ordinary, it is sufficient to their parochial status that some workable division, evolved in practice or by agreement, has been recognized by the Ordinary, inasmuch as he has treated them just as if they were formally defined and erected parishes.¹

(4) If an area is definitely cut off from any other parish and given a priest of its own, it is a parish, but the priest is not necessarily a *parochus*. In a rare case he might be a *vicarius perpetuus*, i.e. if the habitual care of the parish is vested in a moral person, as provided in canon 471. Should his appointment be provisional and temporary, his status will be that of a *vicarius oeconomus*. This should not normally happen, because canon 472, in providing for a vicar of this kind, clearly assumes that the parish is vacant by the death or removal of its parish priest, rather than by delay in the appointment of one. Nevertheless, just as the Ordinary can delay the appointment of a successor to a vacant parish when, in his prudent judgement, "peculiar local and personal circumstances make it advisable" (canon 458), so also, it would seem, he can at least validly delay the appointment of the first parish priest of a new parish. The provision of a *vicarius oeconomus* substantially fulfils the requirement of canon 216 that a "proper pastor" be assigned, since, by canon 473, "he enjoys the same rights and is bound by the same duties as a *parochus*, in things concerning the care of souls". Bearing in mind, moreover, that a new parish is something of an unknown quantity, the Ordinary may have good reason to delay a permanent appointment until he can judge what qualities it requires in the person appointed.

In general, however, provisional appointments should be the exception rather than the rule. As for priests who have been left in doubt as to their status, or boundaries, it is both their right and duty, since important consequences are involved, to get the matter authoritatively settled by the Ordinary as soon as possible.

¹ This was in effect the ruling given (*ibid.*) to the Bishop of Prince Albert and Saskatoon.

MEANING OF "VICARIA PERPETUA" IN
CANON 1427

According to canon 1427, §1, when an Ordinary divides a parish, he can erect either a *vicaria perpetua* or a new parish. What precisely is meant by a *vicaria perpetua* in this context? (H. M.)

REPLY

Canon 1427, §1: "Possunt etiam Ordinarii ex iusta et canonica causa paroecias quaslibet, invitis quoque earum rectoribus et sine populi consensu, dividere, vicariam perpetuam vel novam paroeciam erigentes, aut earum territorium dismembrare."

Canon 471, §1: "Si paroecia pleno iure fuerit unita domui religiosae, ecclesiae capitulari vel alii personae morali, debet constitui vicarius, qui actualem curam gerat animarum, assignata eidem congrua fructuum portione, arbitrio Episcopi."

The law of the Church provides that an individual physical person in priestly orders shall be immediately charged with the spiritual care of every parish. When therefore a parish is incorporated in a moral person, the latter is to be understood as possessing at most the habitual care of souls, the actual care being exercised completely and exclusively by a vicar who has all the rights and duties of a parish priest in this respect. Canon 471, which provides for the appointment of such a vicar, does not assign him a title, but, among pre-Code canonists, he was commonly known as a *vicarius perpetuus*, owing to the juridical permanence of his office, and his charge was commonly called a *vicaria perpetua*.¹ The point to note is that this kind of vicarship presupposes, rather than excludes, the parochial status of the territory in which it is exercised.

Until the question was raised, we had assumed it to be a matter of general agreement that the *vicaria perpetua* of canon 1427 was to be understood in this sense. Collating this canon

¹ Cf. Reiffenstuel, *Ius Canonicum*, lib. III, tit. V, n. 66; Wernz, *Ius Decretalium*, II, n. 840.

with canon 1423, §2, which empowers an Ordinary to unite a parish only to a cathedral or collegial church within the same territory, we took it to mean that, when he divides a parish, he must either unite the detached portion to such a church, if there happens to be one in it, thereby establishing a *vicaria perpetua*, or erect it as a new parish, independent both as to the habitual and as to the actual care of souls. After investigating the question more closely, we still regard this as the more probable interpretation, and we find that it has the support of Vermeersch-Creusen,¹ Claeys-Bouuaert,² Marchesi,³ and Beste.⁴ But among other authors who deal with the question we find a confusing variety of views which, if we understand them rightly, are substantially divergent from our own.

Jone, evading a precise definition, appears to make the distinction between the two forms of parochial organization dependent on the free choice of the Ordinary at the time of the division.⁵ For Sipos, "a *vicaria perpetua* is a territorial part of a diocese, like a parish, but not erected as a parish, with an office not as determined by common law as is the parochial office".⁶ Coronata, equally vague and noncommittal, likewise finds the distinction in the fact that the parochial office, being more closely determined by common law, is less subject to determination by the local Ordinary than is the office of a perpetual vicar.⁷ According to Naz, a *vicaria perpetua* is a detached portion of a parish, "continuant à dépendre de la paroisse primitive, tout en ayant son autonomie".⁸ The latter half of this definition agrees with our own, since, as we have seen, canon 471 makes a perpetual vicar autonomous in the *actual* care of souls, but we can see no reason for requiring that the territory in question shall remain dependent, as to the habitual care, on the parish from which it was carved. Brys agrees with Naz in assuming

¹ *Epitome I.C.*, II, n. 757.

² *Manuale I.C.*, III, n. 219.

³ *Summula I.C.*, II, n. 153.

⁴ *Introductio in Codicem*, ed. 1956, p. 776. This author's definition ("quando districtus a paroecia separatus ecclesiae matrici, cathedrali vel alii personae morali incorporatur") is generically correct, but wider than is compatible with the Ordinary's restricted power in the context of canon 1427.

⁵ *Commentarium in Cod.I.C.* (ed. 1954), p. 566.

⁶ *Enchiridion I.C.* (ed. 1954), p. 649.

⁷ *Institutiones I.C.*, II, n. 983.

⁸ *Dictionnaire de droit canonique*, VI, col. 1246.

that the new unit is "accessorily and perpetually united and subjected to the principal or mother church", but surprisingly adds that the vicar's spiritual care may be "either actual and habitual, or actual only".¹ Finally, Cappello differs from all the others in making the distinction lie in the precise character of the division of the parish. A *vicaria perpetua*, he says, "is a part of a parish, with a church of its own and a determined population, which is assigned to a rector or vicar so that he may exercise the complete care of souls therein. Thus, the territory of a *vicaria* is not cut off and separated from the territory of the parish, and therefore a *vicaria* is necessarily contained within the boundaries of a parish. We say 'necessarily', because, in view of the territorial organization required by the common law (*c.* 216-17), a bishop cannot separate a portion of the territory of a parish and declare it cut off and separated, without thereupon either constituting a new parish, or attaching it to an existing parish".²

Though Cappello's interpretation is concordant, like our own, with the general principle of canon 216 (i.e. that every distinct territorial part of a diocese must be a parish), we find it difficult to accept, first, because it requires the "divide" of canon 1427 to be understood in two different senses (i.e. in the sense of territorial division when a new parish is erected, and in that of purely spiritual division when a *vicaria* is set up), and secondly, because it gives a meaning to *vicaria perpetua* for which there would seem to be no warrant either in the Code, or in pre-Code jurisprudence. For if, as we must presume, the list of parochial vicars in canons 471 to 478 is complete, the vicar of canon 1427 must be found among them. We have identified him with the vicar of canon 471, because, both before and since the Code, he is commonly styled a "vicarius perpetuus", as Cappello himself recognizes,³ and because his office is intrinsically perpetual. As understood by Cappello, however, he can only be identified with the *vicarius cooperator* of canon 476, §2, appointed "pro determinata paroeciae parte". Admittedly, the office of this latter can be erected as a perpetual benefice (canon

¹ *I.C. Compendium*, II, n. 844 C. If the vicar has habitual as well as actual care, it is difficult to see how he differs from a parish priest, or in what sense his territory is subject to another, even accessorialy.

² *Summa I.C.*, II (ed. 1934), n. 876.

³ *Op. cit.*, n. 553.

477, §2), but this is the exception, a very rare exception, rather than the rule. It seems highly unlikely that the codifiers were thinking of this exceptional form of perpetual vicarship, rather than of the normal and traditional form, when they inserted the reference to "vicarium perpetuum" in canon 1427.

Our conclusion is therefore that, when an Ordinary divides a parish by virtue of canon 1427, he can only constitute the detached portion as a *vicaria perpetua* if it contains a cathedral or collegial church to which he chooses to unite it, in so far as the habitual care of souls is concerned. Otherwise, he must erect a new and independent parish. In either case, the divided portion of territory has parochial status, as canon 216 requires.

L. L. McR.

BOOK REVIEWS

Liturgical Latin: Its Origins and Character. Three Lectures by Christine Mohrmann. Pp. 95 (Catholic University of America Press, 1957. \$2.50.)

LANGUAGE is not used only for communication but also for expression. In other words, communicating with our neighbour is not the only use for language, which is besides the interpreter of all the motions of the human mind and above all of human sensibility. The requisites for communication are clarity and simplicity, but users of a language can also strive after richness and subtlety, seeking to perfect it as a medium for expression. Hence arises the gulf between literary and everyday language. The present-day world, influenced by positivism, is inclined to regard language merely as communication and thus to make efficiency and intelligibility its ideals. It is impatient with archaic or stylized language. But language as expression was what the Latin Liturgy aimed at. This is the central thesis of Professor Mohrmann's lectures.

The first lecture is introductory, showing how the early Christians in the west sought for prayer forms far removed from the language of everyday life. In this connexion the use of Aramaic words—an exotic element introduced both for effect and to capture the exact word uttered by Christ or the apostles—is most interesting. We still say Amen in response to our vernacular prayers. The second lecture is on early Christian Latin and the origins of liturgical Latin. It is impossible to summarize it, for it is itself a masterly summary written

with a marvellous economy of words. It could hardly be equalled for thumb-nail sketches of (for example) the giving to Latin words of Christian or biblical meaning, or the attitudes of Christians to pagan literary tradition and their own Christian words. Finally there is an outline of the replacement of Greek by Latin in the liturgy, many generations after Greek had ceased to be understood by the people.

Why this delay? Because Christianity had to wait until its own language had reached sufficient maturity and perfection to serve as an elevated, stylized language, fit for the public praise of God. It had to wait for the Peace of the Church before it lost its distrust of pagan Latin and could adopt certain features of the latter for use in the liturgy. For there was never any question of using colloquial or rough-hewn language.

The final lecture is the one likely to have most general appeal. It takes the chief liturgical prayer forms and analyses the principles of their Latinity. The Canon of the Mass, for instance, uses purely Christian vocabulary but a solemn style based on that of the pagan sacred texts of ancient Rome, which must have made it more or less unintelligible to the average Latin-speaking Christian. In conclusion there is a moderately worded plea for the retention of Latin in the liturgy.

This summary may show the richness of the book. The matter is almost above criticism. The form is unfortunately less perfect. The lecture form limits both length and the mode of presentation. There are minor blemishes in the vocabulary, such as certain French expressions not in common use. Nor is the frequently repeated "sacral", although it exists in dictionaries in reference to style and language, at all common. Occasionally there are words like "viable" and "normativism". The author is described as "Professor (we are not told of what) at the Roman Catholic University of Nijmegen". But the book is timely and well written, while the references should be of value to those not well acquainted with the study of Christian Latin. A grain of this patient, erudite work is worth a bushel of the more enthusiastic but less scholarly pleadings that we are accustomed to.

MARK DILWORTH, O.S.B.

Dictionnaire de droit canonique. Edited by R. Naz. Fasc. XXXVI,
Pauvrete religieuse—Pittoni. (Letouzey et Ané, Paris, 1957.)

THIS rapidly growing repertory of canonical science deserves the attention of Church historians, if only because of the biographical notices which it devotes to all canonists of mark. Indeed, more than

half the entries in this latest fascicle are biographical in character, some of them being quite lengthy, and all of them rounded off with bibliographical references. The topic most fully treated, however, is *personnes morales*, which is studied historically by A. Dumas in sixty columns and canonically by R. Naz in a further seventeen, the two articles forming together a book-length monograph. With this issue the sixth volume is now complete, and, on the present scale, only one more should be required to finish the work.

L. L. McR.

Saint Augustine. By Henri Marrou.

Master Eckhart. By Jeanne Ancelet-Hustache. (Men of Wisdom Books.

191 pages each. Longmans. 6s. each.)

THE authors and publishers are to be congratulated on these books. They are full, erudite, lavishly illustrated, beautifully produced and at the same time wonderfully cheap.

M. Marrou is a noted patristic scholar and Professor of the History of Christianity at the Sorbonne. His book reflects his competent knowledge and the soundness of his judgement. In addition to St Augustine's life and its background, he considers his intellectual power in its greatness and also its faults, such as impetuosity on occasion, and briefly surveys his influence on theology and philosophy to the present day. He includes a number of typical selections from St Augustine's writings. The translators (Mr Patrick Hepburne-Scott for the narrative and Mr Edmund Hill for the selections) have done their work well. Professor John J. O'Meara has adapted and enlarged the original bibliography for the English edition.

St Augustine was a powerful and original genius. So, too, in a way was Eckhart. He was a mystic of a high order. His mystical teaching reflects the Neo-Platonism of St Augustine and Denis the Areopagite; it has its theological basis in the Thomism which he taught as a Dominican Master at Cologne. But, in view of the extravagance of some of his statements, it has never been clear that he was not tainted with the pantheism of the contemporary Beghards. He was tried for heresy at Cologne. He appealed to the Pope, and the judgement of the Holy See was still pending when Eckhart died in 1327, submitting himself unreservedly to the authority of the Church. Two years later John XXII condemned seventeen propositions from his writings as heretical and eleven others as ill-sounding, temerarious and suspect of heresy. Whether, in spite of this condemnation, he will some day be rehabilitated, as the author hopes, is debatable. Her view is that the condemnation was directed not at Eckhart's

doctrine but at the extreme and paradoxical language in which he expressed it.

Mysticism was flourishing in Germany in Eckhart's time, chiefly among the Dominican nuns whom he influenced. It may be that these intellectual women could discern the truth behind his paradoxes. They do not seem to have been led astray. In any case, whatever his faults, he is the recognized father of German mysticism. Suso, Tauler and Ruysbroeck were his disciples; they simplified his thought and pruned his extravagances; but, as the author shows, they thought and prayed under his inspiration.

This is a fine book by a lay theologian, ably translated by Miss Hilda Graef. The lengthy excerpts from Eckhart's works she has translated directly from the original Middle High German in which they were written. Finally, she has adapted the bibliography for English readers.

Prayer in Practice. By Romano Guardini. Pp. vi + 228 (Burns Oates. 10s. 6d.)

MGR GUARDINI deals mainly with personal, individual prayer. Such prayer is in a sense spontaneous, but it needs to be schooled and disciplined in accordance with the rules of Scripture and of traditional spiritual doctrine. He discusses the need of preparation for prayer, the basic acts of prayer (praise, thanksgiving and so on), prayer to the Persons of the Trinity, the unique role of Christ in our prayer, the two forms of prayer, oral and mental, which he styles simply contemplative prayer.

Prayer necessarily varies according to the varieties of temperament in men and the many changes to which they are subject. It varies also as God's manifestations vary, since it is a response to God and the vital bond between the creature and his all-holy Creator. As a supernatural and therefore mysterious activity, it constantly runs the risk of being neglected; but man must never yield to weakness or instability in so vital a matter; if needs be, he must stand and endure. In dealing with the difficulties of prayer the author is broad, generous and encouraging.

Personal prayer is subjective. It needs therefore to be corrected by the objective. If it is exclusively practised it may become selfish, bizarre, even diseased. The corrective is furnished by the liturgy and popular devotions. The liturgy, symbolically re-enacting the great Christian religious events, takes a man out of his separateness and makes him part of a whole, a living organ through which the total message of the Church is expressed and enacted. Hence the liturgy and personal prayer mutually sustain each other, and in their com-

combination make the Christian life complete. The liturgy without personal prayer will lose value. Popular devotions lie between the liturgy and personal prayer. They are communal, but less strict and universal, more local and intimate than the liturgy. The liturgy is not everything; popular devotions have their place; but, says Mgr Guardini, when there is no liturgy but only popular devotions, the life of a parish becomes impoverished.

Some idea of the value of this book may appear from this brief analysis. It is a mature and helpful book, treating a well-worn subject with invigorating freshness.

J. C.

Aspects sociologiques du catholicisme américain. Vie urbaine et institutions religieuses. By François Houtart. Pp. 340. (Les Editions Ouvrières, Paris. 1650 fr.)

La France en transition. Etapes d'une recherche. By L.-J. Lebret. Pp. 168. (Les Editions Ouvrières, Paris. N.p.)

Construire des églises. Les dimensions des paroisses et les contradictions de l'apostolat dans les villes. By Paul Winninger. Pp. 253. (Les Editions du Cerf. 510 fr.)

Ville marxiste terre de mission. By M. Delbré. Pp. 238. (Les Editions du Cerf. 480 fr.)

THE phenomenal growth and present size of the Church in the United States are in keeping with the general history and statistics of that country, but until recently there has been little objective evaluation of the strength and weaknesses of the Church, due to what Mgr Tracy Ellis has called "a filiopietistic approach and an unwillingness to face up to unpleasant facts". In the past ten years both in the fields of history and of sociology a number of studies have begun to appear—in history the lead has been given by Mgr Tracy Ellis and in sociology by Fr Fichter, S.J.—which are the result of serious and mature scholarship. Fr Houtart's book is a worthy addition to their number particularly as his contributions, demographic, ecological, statistical and historical, all of them basic and empirical, are in domains in which to the present very little work has been done.

The book is divided into two quite separate and distinct sections. In the first Fr Houtart traces the evolution of the Catholic community in the United States, from the settlement of the immigrants through the vicissitudes of the national parishes to the present-day structure, practice and possible fields of expansion for the future. In the second part he concentrates on the Catholics of Chicago—the

archiepiscopal see of the most populous diocese in the world—and makes a thorough study of the assimilation of the various national groups, of the demographic position of the parishes and of the age and distribution of the clergy. This is particularly well done and no detail is neglected—one of his conclusions is that, given the present trend, few assistant priests have the possibility of becoming pastors before the age of fifty. Finally one arrives at the microcosm, a study of religious practice in one Chicago parish.

Although Fr Houtart's approach is largely statistical—and he calls attention to the difficulty of finding scientifically valid statistics, a problem not peculiar to the United States—in his conclusion he writes briefly of the problems facing the Church in the U.S.A. today. The most important of these is what Archbishop Alter has called "a condition of religious fixation", i.e. religious belief is accepted as a social fact like race, or colour, or language and is not to be tampered with. The "American Way of Life" includes religion, but is indifferent about the form it takes, whether Catholic, Protestant or Jewish. President Eisenhower himself voiced this sentiment recently when he said, "Our form of government has no sense unless it is founded on a deeply felt religious faith, and I don't care what it is." It may be that religiosity will turn out to be the worst enemy of true religion.

Fr Lebret's book, which is published in the same series of studies of religious sociology, is an object lesson of how the analytical methods of *Economie et Humanisme* can be applied to particular regions and is the first of a number of such studies which the group has made. The areas covered by Fr Lebret range from the coast of Brittany to the French Alps, and in each of them he has over a period of time studied the effects of materialism on the religious practice and structures of their inhabitants. Each section makes fascinating reading, but the author is at pains to emphasize that these are no more than preliminary studies to try out the research tools that he and his collaborators have evolved. For that reason the chief interest for the general reader lies in his concluding reflexions on the method of religious sociology and in his tentative summary of the major constants to be found in a France which is in transition. The most encouraging, and for some readers the most unexpected, is that there is in France "a remarkable spiritual and apostolic renaissance".

The proof of this is to be found in the two latest additions to the *Rencontres* series. In the first M. Winninger discusses the pastoral problem of large cities, and in particular the impossibility of running (and of fulfilling the obligations laid down in the Code for those who

have charge of) excessively large parishes. While he is writing especially of France, a good third of the book is given over to an enquiry on recent developments in the division of parishes into smaller units in Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany, where the trend is to make smaller parishes and build more churches. Knowing that the major objection to this is usually that of finance, M. Winniger deals with the cost of building in these different countries. At the same time he makes a plea for the use of the latest planning techniques in foreseeing future needs, and instances as a model in this regard the work of the *Katholiek Sociaal Kerkelijk Institut* whose services are used extensively by the Dutch Hierarchy. The whole book is well argued, based on the relevant considerations of doctrine and Canon Law and is eminently practical.

With Mlle Delbré's work one goes from the general to the particular. For the past twenty-five years she has lived in Ivry, a town in the Paris region which is famous, or notorious, as a centre of Communism. Apart from the war years the municipality has been in the hands of the Communists, and it is the key point of the constituency which has regularly returned Maurice Thorez to the Chamber of Deputies. Mlle Delbré describes this Communist territory without rancour or enmity, showing how the party line is the same whether in Ivry or Moscow, discussing what form the apostolate must take when one is in daily contact with Marxists. Indirectly she throws a great deal of light on the reasons why the experiment of the priest-workers had to be discontinued, and makes valuable suggestions for the place of apostolic organizations in this type of environment. This personal testimony at times quite moving is much more compelling than a work of pure theory twice its size.

J. F.

Medieval Cartularies of Great Britain. A Short Catalogue. By G. R. C. Davis. (Longmans. 30s.)

ONE of the many signs of the great advance in mediaeval studies is the skill and care now bestowed upon the perfecting of the instruments of research, and there could be no better example of it than this handsomely produced volume. The making of these lists of cartularies was actually discussed more than a quarter of a century ago and it is twenty years since the work was "provisionally accepted for future publication" by the Royal Historical Society. Since 1949 Mr G. R. C. Davis, a British Museum expert, an Assistant Keeper in the Department of Manuscripts, has been continuously employed upon the task and has travelled five thousand miles around Great Britain in search of the materials. The learned author, the Museum

authorities, and the Leverhulme Trust, which facilitated the work, are all to be warmly congratulated on the result. To the whole of the antiquarian tribe, archivists, paleographers, local historians, heralds, genealogists, liturgiologists and the rest it will be of immense and lasting value.

As registers of muniments of many kinds, cartularies, comprising charters, royal, papal and episcopal grants and privileges and much else, are naturally of the first importance as sources of information. Ever since the Dissolution of the Monasteries let loose a flood of them upon the outside world there has been a noiseless and unseen fight between the agencies of preservation and the far more numerous agencies of destruction and loss. Comparatively few passed at the dissolution to the Exchequer; the great bulk of them were naturally retained by the new owners as title-deeds and so have remained in private possession until modern times when they began to be handed over to the P.R.O. to libraries, universities, colleges and other institutions.

Habent sua fata libelli. Many stories could doubtless be told of how these bundles of documents have come to light or been rescued. One of them, concerning an Augustinian priory in Northants, had lain unnoticed in the Court of Arches since 1670, when it was produced in a law-suit. Another, of great value, relating to the Abbey of Abingdon, had been at an Oxford bookseller's throughout the nineteenth century. Another was found in a London junk-shop. A secular cartulary found its way to Lexington in Kentucky in 1806. Some may yet await discovery in ruined towers or bricked-up priest's holes. Many of the most important documents owe their preservation to being bound up with Gospel-books and other Service-books or behind copies of the Rule of St. Benedict; that was often done in the greater monasteries.

After a full explanation of the whole matter, of the various types of cartularies, their descent, their treatment, a note on the Finding Lists, from Dugdale downwards, and particulars of the methods used in the present catalogue, come three numbered lists: the Religious Houses—this in the widest sense to include bishoprics, cathedrals, collegiate and even parish churches, hospitals and houses of the Military Orders—for England and Wales to the number of 1109; for Scotland, 76; and there are 159 entries for secular cartularies which record the possessions of such magnates as the Beau-champs (Earls of Warwick), the Courtenays (Earls of Devon) and the Mowbrays (Dukes of Norfolk, Earls of Nottingham, etc.) as well as those of smaller landowners.

Here is part of the entry for Buckfast:

BUCKFAST. Cist. Abbey, co. Devon. f. 1136. No. 85. **BUCKFAST ABBEY LIBRARY.** Leaves from an early 14th cent. cartulary (after 1313) with a few additions incl. perambulations of Dartmoor &c. at the end. Contains copies of about 60 charters arranged and numbered topographically, each leaf being headed in red *Tertia Pars*. The material relates to Buckfastleigh, Hone and vicinity. . . . c. 1890 from Pearse, waste-paper merchant, Exeter, acquired again from Pearse, 1932.

J. J. D.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE OSCOTT LEGEND

(*THE CLERGY REVIEW*, June 1958, p. 349)

The Rev. W. J. Jorêt writes:

In reference to Fr McIver's article in *THE CLERGY REVIEW* for June 1958, there is an observation that should be made. On p. 349 he records the well-known "fact" that Fr Francis Martyn was the first priest ordained from Oscott and *the first priest educated entirely in England since the Reformation*. The second half of this statement is what I have called the Oscott Legend, and it is high time the true facts were made known, as the legend has an honourable history. No one loves to lose a proud memory, but this particular honour does not belong to Oscott. Pride must give place to the pressure of fact. In brief, I have not yet found out who was the first priest to receive his entire ecclesiastical training in England since the Reformation, nor which college has the privilege of ranking him among her alumni; but certainly the distinction belongs neither to Fr Martyn nor to Oscott.

The first thing which put me upon the track of the legend was a reading of the life of Dr Joseph Bowdon. Martyn was ordained on 21 December 1805. The usual sources say that Bowdon was ordained on 5 September 1805. This would put him three and a half months above Martyn. However, Bowdon was ordained at Old Hall, and the Ordination Register in the archives of St Edmund's, Ware, which is surely the most reliable source, states that he was ordained on 22 September 1804, along with John Browne. I have found no evidence that either of them studied abroad, and, whichever date is correct, Martyn's case cannot stand. Nor can Bowdon be claimed as an alumnus of the seminary at Old Oscott. It is true that he went to the school in 1794, the year that it was opened, but he went as a lay student, and left early in 1796. He stayed at home for two years to decide on his future, and entered Old Hall as a church

student in July 1798. There is nothing in his biographies which suggests that he spent any time in study abroad, but he cannot be claimed as a product of the Old Oscott seminary. Moreover, the same Ordination Register gives names of others, ordained prior to this date, only some of whom are definitely known to have begun their studies abroad, e.g. at Douay, St Omer, Rome or elsewhere, and to have completed them in the new English colleges at home after the troubles on the continent at the end of the eighteenth century. The first of these entirely "home-produced" priests may have been John Haly, ordained on 19 September 1801, or Matthew Molinari—18 December 1802. Even then this leaves entirely on one side possible claims from Stonyhurst and Ushaw. Unfortunately, my researches into the matter are not complete, but enough has been established to show that this story, at least, can no longer be one of Oscott's proud claims. It is strange that the legend has such an honourable history: it can be traced back, from Fr McIver's article, to the *Heritage Magazine* of April 1957, to numerous less recent publications, to the 1888 Jubilee number of the *Oscotian* and beyond, into the very life time of Fr Martyn (*Catholic Magazine*, 1835)—but it is a legend, none the less.

PRAYERS AT FOOT OF ALTAR

"Attente" writes:

It is sometimes recommended that at Dialogue (or Community) Mass a vernacular Entrance Hymn be sung while the Prayers at the foot of the Altar (*Judica psalm*, *Confiteor*, etc.) are being recited in a subdued voice by the priest and server. But Rub. Gen. Missalis No. 16 orders that at *Missa Privata* these prayers be recited *clara voce . . . ut quae leguntur intelligant*.

Is not Dialogue Mass a form of *Missa Privata* (not equivalent to *Missa Solemnis*, when other rules apply) so that audibility of these prayers is obligatory?

Ritus servandus in Celebration Missae, III, 9, 10, even supposes that those attending the Mass may join with the server in reciting the *Confiteor* during the Prayers at the foot of the Altar. Does not this provision also indicate that a vernacular hymn is out of place at this time?

PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

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